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ExEcutivE Summary
Collaboration among industry, government, and medicine in the pursuit of clinical re-
search is critical to driving scientific progress, particularly as industry increasingly replaces 
government as the primary source of research funding.  However, the compensation method-
ologies employed by industry, as well as other financial relationships between industry and 
physicians, create potential conflicts of interest that possibly jeopardize the rights and well-
being of research participants as well as the integrity of research results.  
While the landscape of clinical research has changed dramatically – the number of trials 
has increased, industry funds a larger proportion of research, and more research now occurs 
in physicians’ private offices – federal policy on recruitment and enrollment, and conflicts of 
interest in research more generally, has not changed substantially.  




•     The goal for public policy should be to structure physician-investigator payment to achieve 
financial neutrality between treatment and research, thus ensuring that a physician’s 
decision to conduct clinical research, as well as his or her decision to recommend that 
a particular individual participate in a clinical trial, is grounded in reasons unrelated to 
investigator compensation.
•     Public policy in this area should be developed in the first instance through the regulatory 
process, to facilitate careful identification and discussion of the issues and to facilitate the 
development of best practice models.  Reform through the prosecutorial process leads to 
an undue focus on outlier cases, lacks transparency, and does not include the voices of all 
relevant stakeholders.
Compensation for Research
• Per Capita and Global Payments: Current federal policy does not provide sufficient 
guidance about the principles or methodology by which to determine the “fair market 
value” of a physician-investigator’s services in the clinical research context.  Government 
regulations providing guidance on investigator compensation should seek to achieve fi-
nancial neutrality as between treatment and research.  The fair market value of physician 
time in the clinical research context should track the fair market value of physician time 
spent engaged in clinical work.  In order to avoid a disincentive for physicians to conduct 
research, compensation for clinical trial work should include delineated reimbursement for 
expenses, such as screening interviews or tests and data monitoring and reporting, that do 
not arise in the clinical context. 
• Finder’s Fees and Bonuses for Recruitment and Retention: The federal government 
should bar the following: any payment solely for a referral to a research trial, any payment 
methodology that conditions payment for expenses attendant to screening potential par-
ticipants on the individual enrolling in the trial, and all bonuses for recruiting or retaining 
a certain number of participants.  These types of payments create conflicts of interest that 
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment
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can incentivize investigators to recruit and retain individuals who do not meet the study’s 
inclusion and exclusion criteria or to deemphasize information that might discourage indi-
viduals from consenting to trial enrollment.   
• Payment with Equity Interests: The federal government should also prohibit compensa-
tion for research in the form of an equity interest in the sponsor of a clinical trial.  
Other Conflicts of Interest in Research
•    The current framework for federal policy to oversee investigators’ conflicts of interest 
should be revised to specify certain conflicts that will disqualify a researcher from serv-
ing as an investigator.  For example, holdings by investigators or their immediate family 
members that provide a direct interest in the outcome of the research, such as stock or 
stock options in a privately held company or equity in a publicly traded company above a 
de minimis amount, should be barred. Compelling circumstances may justify individuals 
with such interests to perform consulting services on matters related to the trial, but any 
such cases should be reported to the Food & Drug Administration prior to the trial’s com-
mencement.  The same policy should also apply to intellectual property interests in a drug, 
device or other product investigated by the clinical trial.  
•     Federal regulations should require that all other conflicts of interest, arising from the var-
ied and frequent financial relationships between industry and physicians, be identified and 
managed.  
Enhancing Institutional Oversight of Conflicts of Interest
•     Federal regulations should be amended to require the following: 
• At the commencement of research, institutions should evaluate relationships between 
industry and physician-investigators to determine if the magnitude and form of the in-
dividual’s financial interest with the sponsor, the longevity of the relationship, or other 
factors suggest that there is a conflict of interest requiring elimination, reduction, or 
management.
• Investigators should be required to report all financial interests, irrespective of amount, 
to an institutional committee for review, rather than leaving it up to investigators to de-
termine if the interest could reasonably be expected to affect the research.  Institutions 
should also be required to establish internal databases that investigators must update 
as information changes about their financial relationships with for-profit entities.
•  Individual institutions should have the discretion to determine whether to create a 
special conflicts of interest committee to review and manage individual investigators’ 
conflicts of interest or whether to delegate those responsibilities to the institutional 
review board (IRB).  
•  For research conducted in academic medical centers, a committee of the board of 
directors, including members independent of management and the faculty, should 
oversee institutional conflicts of interest in research. The board committee’s oversight 
should extend beyond the primary institutions, such as the medical school or univer-
sity, to any not-for-profit institutes or for-profit corporate entities that are substantially 
controlled by or operate under the auspices of the medical school or university.
The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
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Overseeing Conflicts of Interest Outside of Academic Medical Centers
•    Review and management of investigator or institutional conflicts of interest prior to the 
time that research begins should be mandated by regulation and subject to contemporane-
ous government oversight.  
•     Federal regulations should charge IRBs with review of conflicts of interest held by investi-
gators and entities conducting research in community settings.  Federal regulations should 
provide clear guidance to IRBs about the nature and scope of information they should 
review, the standards for the review, and the alternatives for eliminating, minimizing, or 
managing a conflict, both for investigators and institutions.  Federal regulations should 
also spell out clearly the obligation of community-based physicians acting as investigators 
or institutions acting on their behalf to report information about compensation for research 
and other financial interests to IRBs.  
Achieving Transparency
•     Federal law should require disclosure of payments for conducting clinical trials and other 
relevant financial interests.  Specifically, before research commences, research sponsors 
should report to the Food & Drug Administration and recipients of federal grants should 
report to the granting federal agency relevant equity and ownership interests as well as all 
payments, above a de minimis amount, to the investigator and the investigator’s institution 
or practice group by the company whose product is under review in the clinical trial.  
Enhanced Training for Investigators
•      Federal regulation should require that training about the nature of conflicts of interest, their 
potential for harm, and the ways that conflicts can be managed, reduced, or eliminated 
should be mandatory for all investigators who conduct clinical research within and outside 
of academic medical centers.  For physician-investigators outside of academic medicine, 
training should also cover key elements of research: the importance of inclusion and ex-
clusion criteria and informed consent, the ethical and scientific issues posed by particular 
research methods such as double blind placebo-controlled studies, and their obligations as 
an investigator as compared with those of a treating physician. 
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment
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iNtrODuctiON
The collaboration between industry and medicine in the arena of clinical research is 
critical to driving scientific progress.  This collaboration leads to the production of drugs and 
devices to prevent, diagnose, and cure illness, as well as innovations that prolong the lives and 
improve the quality of life of seriously ill patients.  Investigators, both inside and outside of 
academic medical centers, depend on industry funds to advance clinical research to break new 
barriers in patient care.  This reliance on industry to fund research and innovation has brought 
with it increasing financial ties between drug and device companies and the physicians and 
institutions who conduct research.
Recent media coverage, government reports, and the academic literature have highlight-
ed the pervasive nature of conflicts of interest between medicine and industry in treatment, 
medical education, and scientific publication.1  Congressional investigations, government pros-
ecutions, and press reports revealing the nature and extent of these conflicts have led to calls 
for reform.2 Most recently, congressional inquiries have focused on “ghostwriting,” the prepa-
ration of articles on research findings undertaken by industry, and attributed to scholars paid 
to lend their names to the reported results.3  Reform measures and proposals have focused on 
greater transparency in the financial relationships between pharmaceutical and medical device 
companies on the one hand and physicians and health care facilities on the other.4  State legisla-
tures have taken the lead in barring certain activities that create conflicts, such as gifts, meals, 
and other financial benefits for physicians.5  However, substantial conflicts in clinical research 
remain unaddressed. 
This White Paper focuses on conflicts of interest in the research context; specifically 
those that potentially affect physicians in their roles as investigators overseeing clinical trials. 
Conflicts of interest in this context have the potential to affect the rights and interests of those 
who volunteer to participate in clinical trials.  When investigators have financial interests in 
the outcome of the research or stand to gain substantially from conducting a clinical trial, it 
may affect their judgment throughout the conduct of the trial, including the many judgments 
that must be made during the process of enrolling and recruiting individuals to participate as 
research subjects.  Potential participants can be harmed by recruitment practices that insuf-
ficiently inform them of the risks of the study, ignore medical conditions that place them at risk 
in the trial, or encourage them to discontinue or forego a treatment regimen likely to be better 
for them than the regimen being evaluated in the trial.  Manufacturers have also conducted 
studies as a way of introducing physicians to their products and obtaining the physicians’ brand 
loyalty, rather than as a genuine scientific inquiry.6  Even if enrollees are not physically harmed 
in these studies, they are asked to participate in research that is a sham, violating the trust 
they have placed in the researchers who recruited them.  Such studies undermine the integrity 
of the research enterprise; public revelation of the studies is likely to diminish willingness to 
participate in research.  
Moreover, the scientific integrity and validity of the research results may be impaired 
whenever a financial conflict influences the judgment of physician-researchers in the recruit-
ment and enrollment process.  Each clinical trial has a protocol that enumerates the eligibility 
criteria for trial participation.  If physicians recruit individuals who do not meet a study’s inclu-
sion and exclusion criteria, for example because their disease is not of the severity specified in 
the study protocol or because they take certain medications the protocol prohibits, the resultant 
study data may not be valid.
The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
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The emphasis of this White Paper is on the conflicts of interest that arise when physi-
cian-investigators or the institutions under whose auspices clinical trials are conducted have a 
financial incentive to enroll individuals in clinical research or a financial relationship with the 
trial sponsor that potentially threatens the objectivity of their decisions regarding the pursuit 
of such research.  We also recognize the negative consequences that may exist when com-
pensation for research is so inadequate that it discourages physicians and institutions from 
conducting research at all.  A recent New York Times article reported that the “great majority” 
of oncologists decline to participate in clinical trials because “[t]hey make little or nothing on 
trials and, in fact, often lose money.”7  Clearly, financial incentives and disincentives alike have 
the potential to influence physicians’ judgment in the recruitment and enrollment process.8
In analyzing investigator over-compensation, we address both the specific reimburse-
ment for a particular trial as well as, in some contexts, the totality of the physician’s financial 
relationship with the trial sponsor.  This White Paper argues that the goal for public policy 
should be to structure physician-investigator payment to achieve financial neutrality between 
treatment and research.  This approach would ensure that a physician’s decision to conduct 
clinical research, as well as his or her decision to recommend that a particular patient partici-
pate in a clinical trial, is grounded in reasons unrelated to investigator compensation.
Evolving market realities underscore the importance of public policies to address con-
flicts of interest, especially as they relate to enrollment and recruitment.  Pressures to develop 
health care products, obtain government approval, and bring them to market as quickly as 
possible have increased in recent years.  This pressure extends to testing new products and 
the need to recruit and enroll more participants into research.  These market forces are likely 
to intensify as patents for blockbuster drugs expire, drug pipelines dwindle, and companies 
face the current economic downturn.  Potential health care and patent reform create additional 
uncertainties for drug and device makers.   
The number of clinical trials in the United States has climbed dramatically in recent 
years. Between 2000 and 2006, clinical trials increased from 40,000 to 59,000 – a nearly 50 
percent jump.9  At the same time, the Food & Drug Administration’s (FDA) heightened atten-
tion to ensuring that products are safe before granting marketing approval has led to more trials 
in each development phase, to more participants in each trial, and to increasingly complicated 
protocols, all of which heighten recruitment hurdles.10  Nearly a third of clinical trial time – 
more than any other clinical trial activity – is spent recruiting participants.11  Moreover, recruit-
ment and enrollment problems lead to nearly half of all clinical trial delays, with more than 
70% of clinical trials delayed from one to six months.12  These delays increase drug and device 
companies’ out-of-pocket expenses and run down the clock on the period during which compa-
nies can earn government-protected monopoly profits for sale of the products being studied.  
The current economic climate presents additional challenges for policymakers concerned 
with protecting the rights and interests of prospective research participants throughout the 
recruitment and enrollment process.  Illness, economic circumstances, and other situational 
factors can create or exacerbate vulnerabilities of research participants.  Individuals living 
in poverty or without health insurance are disproportionately likely to participate in clinical 
research.13  Under-employment and loss of health insurance make clinical trials appealing to 
some potential participants who otherwise would not consider enrolling but are attracted by the 
promise of payment or free health care attendant to the trial.  Recent media reports reveal that 
growing numbers of healthy individuals are turning to Phase I trials (in which drugs are tested 
in humans for the first time) to earn money;14 this type of trial attracts primarily low-income 
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment
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minority men.15  Even before the economic downturn, press reports noted that some lower 
socio-economic class individuals, often immigrants, rely on clinical research as their primary 
source of income.16  The ranks of clinical trial participants also include many individuals, pre-
dominantly uninsured white women, who choose to participate in Phase II or III trials in part 
to obtain health care.17  
The clinical trial system necessarily relies on the physician-investigators who conduct 
research to serve as trustworthy gatekeepers, protecting both the integrity of the research as 
well as the health and welfare of the individuals upon whom the experimental products are be-
ing tested.  However, as the drug and device industry has funded a growing share of clinical 
research, physician-investigators are increasingly the recipients of financial incentives creat-
ing conflicts that may undermine their ability to serve in this role.  Before 1980, the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH) funded most medical research.18  In the 1980s, however, NIH fund-
ing fell and drug industry funding rose six-fold.19  Today, drug and medical device companies 
fund up to 80% to 90% of all clinical trials; in 2005, industry invested 78% more in research 
and development than did the federal government.20  Although the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act allotted $8.2 billion dollars to the NIH for research,21 this stimulus funding 
is a one-time infusion of money, and is slated to end in September 2010.  As a result, industry 
will continue to serve as the primary source of funding for clinical research. 
As funding for clinical research has shifted, its locus has as well.  In addition to aca-
demic medical centers, research is now conducted in community hospitals, doctors’ offices, 
and research institutes.22  By 2004, nearly 75% of the clinical research sites sponsored by 
industry were physicians in private practice or for-profit research centers.23  Between 1994 
and 2004, academic medical centers fell from 63% to 26% of sites where clinical research is 
conducted.24  The shift away from academic medical centers creates several distinct concerns 
about financial conflicts of interest, primarily because when physicians in private practice 
conduct industry-funded research, they may profit directly and personally from recruiting, 
enrolling, and retaining patients in research.25  Community-based physician-investigators also 
generally have less training and experience conducting clinical trials than those in academic 
medicine.26  In addition, community-based physicians are likely to recruit their own patients 
to participate in clinical trials.27  Combined with the high level of trust patients place in their 
personal physicians,28 this heightens the risk that prospective participants might agree to enroll 
in a trial without making an independent evaluation of its risks and benefits.  The phenomenon 
of the therapeutic misconception may also arise, whereby research participants do not under-
stand the distinction between treatment – proposed or provided by their physician solely for 
their benefit – and research, which may provide clinical benefits for participants in some trials, 
but is not designed primarily to serve their interests.29  
Physician-investigators at academic medical centers are also subject to conflicts of inter-
est that may affect recruitment and enrollment decisions.  Physicians in academia face insti-
tutional pressure to secure research funding to support their salaries, and their salaries may 
vary depending upon the amount of funding they obtain.  They also have other incentives to 
conduct research, including publication of the results in the medical literature, a requirement 
for tenure and promotion.30    
Civil lawsuits, government investigations and prosecutions, and news investigations have 
shed light on conflicts of interest that may have adversely affected recruitment and enrollment 
or the actual conduct of clinical trials, and, more tragically, possibly placed participants at seri-
ous risk of harm.  In one well-known case, 18-year old Jesse Gelsinger died while participating 
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in a Phase I gene therapy trial.31  Jesse Gelsinger’s father sued the researchers, the hospitals that 
employed the researchers, the university that approved and sponsored the trial and employed a 
bench scientist involved with the trial, and a bioethicist who consulted on the trial’s design.32 
Among other claims, Jesse’s father asserted that the researchers committed fraud, based in 
part on the fact that neither the researchers nor the informed consent document told Jesse or 
his father that the study’s co-principal investigators and the university institute conducting the 
research had a substantial equity stake in the vector used in the clinical trial.33  
In 2006, Katrina McKenzie, a participant in a clinical trial of ceramic-on-ceramic hip 
implants, brought a suit against her surgeon and the hospital where the implant surgery oc-
curred.34  The implants in both of McKenzie’s hips failed, requiring her to undergo additional 
surgeries.  McKenzie’s surgeon testified in a deposition that he received no direct financial 
benefit from the implant trial because the payments from the device maker which sponsored 
the trial went to the academic medical center which employed him.  McKenzie’s surgeon con-
ceded, however, that the trial sponsor did pay him between $20,000 and $50,000 a year for 
consulting work – income that he had not disclosed to McKenzie.  In an article in the Philadel-
phia Inquirer, McKenzie’s lawyer asserted that the surgeon had a conflict of interest which may 
have influenced his decision to use the experimental hip implants in McKenzie’s case.  McKen-
zie’s surgeon denied any negligence.  The case settled in August 2008 on the eve of trial.35  
A 1999 New York Times investigation highlighted the case of Thomas Parham, who 
enrolled in a clinical trial of a prostate drug at his doctor’s encouragement.36  Parham had pre-
viously been hospitalized for a chronic slow heart rate, and the clinical trial’s protocol specifi-
cally excluded patients with that condition from participating in the study.  Parham’s physician 
did not inform Parham that the physician was paid $1,610 for each patient enrolled, an amount 
that covered study expenses and allowed for a profit for the physician and his associates.  Par-
ham’s physician informed the drug company sponsoring the trial about Parham’s slow heart 
rate but failed to tell the company about his prior hospitalization.  Soon after joining the study, 
Parham complained of fatigue, a symptom of a slow heart rate, but his doctor dismissed his 
complaints.  Within weeks Parham was hospitalized and given a pacemaker.37  
Pharmaceutical companies have also faced government investigation and civil litigation 
for conducting so-called “seeding studies” designed primarily to market a product to physi-
cians but presented as research to the physicians and the patients they recruit – a practice 
that stands to undermine the research enterprise as a whole.  One such study enrolled 5,557 
individuals in a head to head clinical trial of Vioxx and naproxen, with the stated purpose of 
evaluating Vioxx’s gastrointestinal tolerability.38  In fact, a review of company documents 
made public as a result of litigation revealed that the manufacturer’s marketing department de-
signed the study to expose unwitting primary care physicians recruited as study investigators 
to Vioxx in the months before and after its launch.39  An internal memorandum explained that 
the trial design focused on demonstrating the advantages of Vioxx to primary care physicians 
because they were important prescribers.40  The patients who participated were not told of the 
trial’s marketing aims, undermining the validity of their consent.41           
Recently, in another example of “research” misconduct, a government investigation into 
clinical research at Walter Reed Army Medical Center revealed that a principal investigator 
who had systematically falsified research findings had been paid thousands of dollars for con-
sulting work by the corporation that produced the bone growth product under study.42  The 
researcher’s subsequent research at Washington University was suspended when the school 
learned of the physician’s undisclosed conflicts of interest.
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The problems represented by these anecdotal cases require a more pervasive public pol-
icy response than can be accomplished through private litigation, prosecutions, and newspaper 
reports.  At present, however, the government provides little guidance or oversight of com-
pensation for clinical research, or other conflicts that arise from the financial relationships be-
tween industry and investigators and institutions.  Federal regulations and guidance statements 
assign to institutional review boards (IRBs) full responsibility to conduct an ethics review 
of clinical trials involving human subjects, including proposed recruitment and enrollment 
practices.  Yet IRBs have not traditionally been charged to identify and manage conflicts of 
interest.  Rather, government agencies and professional organizations such as the Association 
of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) and the Association of American Universities (AAU) 
recommend that academic medical centers establish standing conflict of interest committees to 
review and manage conflicts of interest.43  These recommendations, however, are not binding 
on academic medical centers or other institutions.   
Institutions that receive federal government funding for medical research, primarily 
medical schools and affiliated hospitals, must establish conflict of interest policies, identify 
the financial interests of investigators, determine if they constitute a conflict of interest, and 
if they do, decide how to manage or minimize the conflict.44  Even where required, conflict 
of interest policies and practices vary substantially from institution to institution.  Moreover, 
recent research focused on academic medical centers has revealed that institutional practices 
diverge with some frequency from written policies.45  Most community hospitals do not have 
conflict of interest committees.  Rather, the institutions’ IRBs are often tasked with reviewing 
investigators’ financial relationships, although it can be difficult for them to gain information 
about such relationships or disapprove of protocols where a conflict of interest exists.46  
Beyond the hospital setting, neither physician offices nor many other organizations in 
the community that conduct research have IRBs.  Consequently, as research has extended 
beyond the walls of the academic medical center, a system of independent (for-profit) IRBs 
has developed to facilitate these institutions’ compliance with federal review requirements.47 
These independent IRBs review and approve the recruitment and enrollment plan as well as 
the ethical issues posed by the proposed study to protect the interests of participants and af-
firm the scientific integrity of the research.48  Physicians and private research institutes are not 
required to provide information to the independent IRB about incentives paid to physicians or 
others to recruit and enroll patients, overall compensation for the clinical trial, or other relevant 
financial interests held by the investigator or entity.  To the contrary, this information is often 
considered proprietary, and is therefore frequently not provided to the IRBs charged to evalu-
ate and approve the research protocol.  
In sum, while the landscape of clinical research has changed dramatically – the number 
of trials has increased and research is now largely funded by industry and conducted outside of 
the academic purview – federal policy on recruitment and enrollment, and conflicts of interest 
in research more generally, has not changed substantially.  Given the mounting pressures to 
recruit and enroll patients and the current lack of government oversight, policy and practice re-
garding conflicts of interest in clinical research recruitment and enrollment cry out for reform. 
Seton Hall Law’s Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy held a forum on 
March 23, 2009 to examine current policy and practice and devise recommendations for 
change.  This White Paper focuses on the need for policy and institutional reform to protect 
potential research participants and the integrity of research in the recruitment and enrollment 
process.  
The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
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currENt PracticES iN cLiNicaL rESEarcH
The drug, device, and biotechnology industries currently fund the majority of clinical 
trials across a range of settings including academic medical centers, community hospitals, 
physician practices, and research centers and institutes.  The government also funds extramu-
ral research, primarily in the academic setting.  Conflicts of interest can arise for investigators 
and institutions due to the compensation methodologies for research as well as the broad array 
of other financial relationships between industry and physicians or their employers. 
A. Definition of Conflict of Interest
In its recent report, Conflict of Interest in Medical Research, Education, and Practice, 
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) defined “conflict of interest” as “a set of circumstances that 
creates a risk that professional judgment or actions regarding a primary interest will be un-
duly influenced by a secondary interest.”49  Physician-investigators in clinical research have 
several primary obligations: i) promoting and protecting the scientific integrity of the research; 
ii) protecting the well-being of participants; and iii) contributing to scientific advances.50  In 
addition, investigators may have a host of secondary interests motivating their participation in 
research, such as earning the respect of colleagues, supplementing their income, or advancing 
their career.  Importantly, there is nothing inherently wrong with these secondary influences. 
The term “conflict of interest” does not equate to compromised judgment or action but to the 
risk of such compromise.  
This White Paper focuses on secondary interests that are financial in nature.  As ex-
plained by the IOM in its report, financial interests may be no more likely to unduly influence 
an investigator than other secondary interests but, because they are more easily measured, they 
can be managed through broad-based reform of policy and practice.  
B. Compensation for Research
 1.  Per-Capita Payments     
Under the most common compensation arrangement, the sponsoring company pays 
investigators or the institutions that employ them a fixed amount per research participant 
enrolled.51  This amount can encompass payment for clinical procedures, physician time, facil-
ity use, laboratory costs, pharmacy fees, research coordinator or nurse salaries, and overhead 
costs.52  Also covered are the time spent and costs incurred on nontreatment trial activities 
such as participant recruitment, the informed consent process, randomization of study medi-
cation, adverse events reporting, data management and analysis, audits and communications 
with the sponsor, and post study follow-up and meetings.53  A study estimating the clinical and 
nonclinical hours and costs associated with conducting a Phase III oncology trial concluded 
that the time spent on nontreatment activities was “considerable, and the associated costs are 
substantial.”54  Typically, sponsors have schedules of standard fees for the procedures required 
by clinical trial protocols; investigators and their institutions have their own schedules, and the 
two parties negotiate the payment for the trial.55       
Under legal standards set by federal and state laws barring remuneration for referring 
patients into treatment, compensation for treatment or services paid for by government must 
not exceed “fair market value.”56  These rules were not developed with clinical research in 
mind.  Nonetheless, they underlie federal law on research compensation; the concept of fair 
market value drives both industry analysis and enforcement oversight.   
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Because federal law provides little guidance about how reasonable or fair market value 
compensation should be determined, or even how to define what the “market” is, companies 
and the consultants upon whom they rely have developed their own methodologies.  A range 
of methods to set compensation for clinical research has emerged, including: (i) a company’s 
own past practice; (ii) compensation surveys; (iii) the use of independent third parties to con-
duct fair market value assessments; (iv) benchmarks such as the Medicare reimbursement rate 
for a given procedure; and (v) a combination of these methods or other methods altogether.57 
Inconsistencies abound.  
While per capita payments are relatively uncontroversial within industry and the medi-
cal profession, they are not unproblematic.  Whenever a physician-investigator is paid more 
for conducting research than for treating patients, he or she has a financial incentive to enroll 
patients in research, and a potential conflict of interest arises.58  Further, some evidence sug-
gests that industry pays physician-investigators more for their services than the government 
or private insurance companies.  A 2002 article in JAMA reported that manufacturers offered 
investigators two to five times the compensation paid by NIH, and that manufacturers paid 
fees several-fold greater than those of Medicare or third-party carriers.59  A Kaiser Permanente 
health care economist makes a similar claim, stating that study sponsors frequently pay top-
of-the-market rates that serve as a source of profit for research sites.60  Other experts contest 
these claims, pointing to evidence that payments for clinical research have remained stagnant 
as clinical trial protocols have grown increasingly complex, leading to a decline in the number 
of physicians willing to undertake clinical research.61  
 2.  Global Payments 
The government typically pays research institutions a “global payment” to compensate 
them for all work on a clinical trial protocol as well as overhead costs.  The institution bud-
gets for the work of the investigator and other of its employees by multiplying the percentage 
of time employees will spend on the project by their respective salaries.  While the institu-
tion factors into the global payment the number of participants it anticipates will need to be 
recruited to conduct the trial, there is no one-to-one correlation between the number of patients 
enrolled and the amount of the payment. 
Drug, device, and biotechnology companies do not typically use global payments, 
although they do compensate investigators or their institutions for certain fixed expenses 
which can include a startup fee for work conducted in advance of enrollment.  A review of 
over 237,000 industry-investigator contracts worldwide revealed that over half of the contracts 
for clinical research in the United States included a startup fee to cover expenses for activities 
such as agreement processing, protocol review, and preparing the IRB submission.62  Paying 
for expenses such as these separately rather than folding them into a per capita fee makes the 
budgeting process and clinical trial agreement more transparent.  This approach could also 
reduce the conflict of interest caused by high per capita payments.  In addition, it allows for 
reimbursement of recruitment expenses to investigators even when they do not succeed in 
actually enrolling participants into the trial. Reimbursement for this legitimate cost of research 
may reduce the incentive to enroll unqualified candidates to cover expenses.  
 3.  Payment in the Form of Equity in the Sponsor
Some trial sponsors remunerate investigators with company stock or stock options. 
According to New Jersey’s Attorney General, compensation with stock for clinical research 
is a “widespread industry practice.”63  Compensation with equity in the sponsor creates a 
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conflict of interest for physician-investigators because it gives them a stake in the outcome 
of the research.  If the data from the trial are positive, it will boost the sponsor’s bottom line, 
which will in turn increase the investigator’s gain through increased stock value and the poten-
tial for higher dividend payments.  
Remunerating researchers with sponsor stock has been sharply criticized.  In a press 
release announcing the 2009 settlement with device maker Synthes, New Jersey’s Attorney 
General asserted that payment with stock or stock options is “outrageous” and “unaccept-
able.”64 The settlement bans compensation of investigators and research institutions with Syn-
thes stock or stock options.65  In its “Principles on Conduct of Clinical Trials,” PhRMA, the 
trade organization which represents pharmaceutical and some biotechnology companies, also 
states that companies should not compensate investigators with stock or stock options.66  In 
contrast, the Code of Ethics on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals promulgated by 
AdvaMed, the trade group which represents medical device companies, appears to permit all 
forms of compensation as long as they do not constitute a kickback under federal law.67 
 4.  Recruitment and Retention Bonuses 
In some trials, payment by industry sponsors also includes bonuses for attaining enu-
merated recruitment and retention goals.68  Bonuses can be paid for securing IRB approval 
in a timely fashion or for meeting enrollment deadlines.  In some instances, companies pay 
investigators bonuses for exceeding enrollment targets or when research participants complete 
the study or study milestones.  Recruitment incentives can also take the form of a bonus or 
increase in the per-participant payment after a specified number of participants have been en-
rolled.  Finally, companies may establish a structure in which research sites compete with one 
another to recruit a sufficient number of participants; those that meet the quota may be allowed 
to recruit additional participants while those that do not may be dropped from the study.69 
A 2003 survey study revealed that 74% of research sites were compensated by one or more 
“competitive enrollment practices”; 78% of these sites received bonuses for on-time participant 
enrollment and 68% received additional bonuses for over-enrollment.70  
These bonus payments could influence investigators’ decisions about prospective par-
ticipants’ initial or continuing eligibility, thereby potentially placing enrollees at risk or un-
dermining the scientific integrity of the study.  In a report on clinical research involving chil-
dren, the IOM opined that recruitment bonuses are unethical and should be prohibited.71  The 
PhRMA Clinical Trials Principles do not explicitly prohibit recruitment bonuses but implicitly 
discourage them, providing that in cases where enrollment is challenging, payments can be 
made to compensate for the additional time and effort the investigator or institution must ex-
pend on recruitment.72  In addition, some companies, such as Pfizer, have adopted policies that 
explicitly prohibit all incentives “designed to reward the achievement of subject enrollment 
goals within a specified time frame.”73 
5.  Finder’s Fees   
A sponsor may also offer a so-called “finder’s fee,” a payment made to individuals other 
than the investigator, including other physicians, nurses, medical students, or participants in 
the clinical trial, for identifying and referring potential study participants.74  Definitions of 
finder’s fees vary.  As used here, finder’s fee refers to payments solely for referrals, not pay-
ment for services provided at fair market value as part of the recruitment process, such as the 
time and effort involved in screening prospective participants to determine if they are suitable 
candidates or explaining the study to them.75 
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Professional organizations including the American College of Physicians and the 
American Medical Association (AMA) have rejected the use of finder’s fees as unethical.76 
Many academic medical centers prohibit or sharply limit their use;77 some pharmaceutical 
companies refuse to pay such fees as well.78  Moreover, finder’s fees may constitute a kickback 
under federal and state laws.79  Still, a recent study suggests that finder’s fees may be com-
mon.  A 2006 survey of 300 clinical research coordinators in academic medicine, commu-
nity hospitals, physician-based practices, stand-alone research centers, and elsewhere revealed 
that nearly a third (32.1%) of the coordinators had worked on studies in which finder’s fees 
were paid.80 
6.  Salary
Compensation of physician-investigators in the form of a salary does not in itself 
create a financial conflict of interest with the potential to affect recruitment and enrollment. 
Some physicians are employees, for example, of academic medical centers or private physician 
practices, and draw a salary that may or may not be related to productivity goals.  Of course, 
the absence of a direct financial incentive to enroll research participants does not mean that 
salaried investigators are without conflicts.  Their job security, eligibility for tenure and pro-
motion, and ability to secure government grants and other funding in the future may all depend 
on their ability to enroll enough participants to conduct research and publish the findings.
7.  Other Financial Ties between Industry and Investigators and Institutions
In addition to the compensation they receive for conducting clinical trials, investiga-
tors may have an array of other financial ties to drug, device, and biotechnology companies.81 
Industry pays physicians for a broad range of activities, including service on marketing and 
medical advisory boards, consulting work, and promotional speaking.  Traditionally, sales 
representatives have plied doctors with gifts, meals, and other perks, but these are gradually 
disappearing.  One large national survey of physicians in six specialties found that 94% of 
physicians reported some type of financial relationship with industry, ranging from receipt of 
food in the work place (83%) and drug samples (78%) to payments for lectures, consulting, 
and clinical trial work (28%).82  An earlier study found that 43% of scientists in the 50 most 
research-intensive universities received research-related gifts from industry such as biomate-
rials or research equipment, trips to professional meetings, and discretionary funds.83  Physi-
cians also participate in the development of new drugs and devices and may own intellectual 
property as a result, including patents, licenses, and royalty rights.84  In addition, physicians 
may own stock or other equity in drug and device companies, including companies they have 
founded to commercialize their research findings, and may serve on company boards of direc-
tors or as officers.    
Like investigators, research institutions can have financial ties to industry that give rise 
to conflicts of interest.  The AAMC defines an institutional conflict of interest as a situation 
in which “the financial interests of the institution, or of an institutional official acting within 
his or her authority on behalf of the institution, might affect – or reasonably appear to affect 
– institutional processes for the conduct, review, or oversight of human subjects research.”85 
Examples of institutional relationships with industry include investments by the institution or 
its high-level officials in drug, device, or biotechnology companies, industry donations to sup-
port endowed professorships or new construction, and industry grants for continuing medical 
education programs.  Relationships such as these are not rare.  A survey of medical schools 
and teaching hospitals revealed that 60% of department chairs had financial relationships with 
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industry and 67% of departments had received industry support, including receipt of research 
equipment, funding for continuing medical education or resident and fellowship training, and 
unrestricted funds.86  As one notable example, in 2005 the Wall Street Journal reported that the 
Cleveland Clinic had established and invested in a venture capital fund which had a 4.1% stake, 
valued at about $7 million, in AtriCure, a startup company that manufactured a device used 
off-label in heart surgery.87  The chief executive officer of the Clinic sat on AtriCure’s Board of 
Directors and invested in and helped manage the venture capital fund.  At the time of the news 
reports, researchers at the Cleveland Clinic were conducting clinical trials of the AtriCure de-
vice; they also endorsed its use in heart surgery at conferences and in journal articles.   
Some financial ties pose more risk of unduly influencing recruitment and enrollment 
practices than others.  For example, the IOM has recommended that investigators with a “sig-
nificant financial interest in an existing or potential product or a company that could be af-
fected by the outcome” of a clinical trial not be permitted to conduct the research unless their 
participation is justified by compelling circumstances and is effectively managed by the insti-
tution, while PhRMA’s Clinical Trials Principles provide that “[c]linical investigators or their 
immediate family should not have a direct ownership interest in the specific pharmaceutical 
product being studied.”88  These recommendations reflect a judgment that when investigators 
have a financial interest in the outcome of a trial it generates an unacceptable risk that their 
financial holdings may influence decisions about recruitment and enrollment, participant safe-
ty, data integrity, and other aspects of the research.  The AAMC has opined similarly with 
regard to institutional conflicts of interest, setting forth a list of financial relationships between 
industry and institutions which create a rebuttable presumption against conducting research at 
or under the auspices of the institution.89      
C. Institutional Oversight of Payment Practices and Other  
 Conflicts of Interest
1.  Academic Medicine
In successive reports issued in 2001 and 2002, the AAMC recommended that academ-
ic medical centers adopt practices to manage individual and institutional conflicts of inter-
est, including the creation of a conflicts of interest committee to gather information about 
significant financial interests in research, identify those that are conflicts, and determine steps 
to minimize or eliminate the conflict.90  The AAMC also recommended that conflicts commit-
tees appoint a liaison to the IRB and that they report their findings to the IRB before the IRB 
approves the research in question so that the conflicts committee’s determinations can inform 
the IRB’s review of the research protocol.91  Notably, the AAMC’s definition of “significant 
financial interests in research” excludes “[p]ayments to the institution, or via the institution to 
the individual, that are directly related to reasonable costs incurred in the conduct of research 
as specified in the research agreement(s) between the sponsor and the institution.”92  No provi-
sion is made for review of such payments.   
Few question that IRBs should receive information about researchers’ conflicts and the 
conflicts committee’s proposed resolution of those conflicts.93  However, disagreement exists 
about how to resolve contrary recommendations emerging from the IRB and conflicts com-
mittees.94  There is also disagreement about whether IRBs should manage conflicts in the first 
instance, rather than establishing a separate conflicts committee.95  Currently, IRBs are not 
directly charged with conflict review and management and may lack the necessary exper-
tise, time, and resources.  A recent survey of IRB members and chairs in academic medicine 
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment
14 Seton Hall law
revealed that two-thirds believed that IRBs should weigh investigators’ relationships with 
industry as part of the IRBs’ review of the research protocol, regardless of whether the 
conflicts committee deemed the relationship a conflict of interest.96  Less than half of those 
surveyed reported that their IRB always reviewed industry relationships, however.  Reasons 
for not conducting a review included “that the topic didn’t come up (41.8%), they didn’t feel it 
was the IRB’s responsibility (20.0%), it was difficult to obtain the information (19.7%), or the 
IRB lacked the expertise to make an informed decision (11.6%).”97  Notably, IRBs have had 
only limited success managing their own members’ conflicts of interest.98
In a 2008 report evaluating the progress made by academic medical centers in 
implementing the AAMC and AAU conflicts management proposals, a joint AAMC and AAU 
advisory committee concluded that institutions took the proposals seriously, especially those 
addressing individual conflicts, and attempted to implement them, but had fallen short.99  A 
2004 AAMC survey revealed that over three quarters of the responding medical schools had 
created standing conflicts committees but that over a third had failed to establish a rebuttable 
presumption against participation in research by researchers with a financial stake in the out-
come.100  In addition, only a low fraction of the respondents reported that the conflicts commit-
tee had completed its work prior to the IRB’s review and approval of the study at issue.101 
Academic medical centers have found managing institutional conflicts to be even more 
challenging than managing individual conflicts.  Recently published survey data indicates that 
only 30 of 125 responding medical centers had an institutional conflict of interest policy and 
that only 25 institutions reported institutional conflicts to the IRB charged with conducting an 
ethics review of proposed clinical trials.102  Anecdotal evidence also supports the conclusion 
that institutional oversight of both individual and institutional conflicts of interest is uneven. 
Congressional investigations have revealed that several prominent investigators at academic 
medical centers failed to report their industry relationships to their universities.103
2.  Research in Physician Practices, Community Hospitals, and Independent  
   Research Institutes
Even less oversight of conflicts of interest exists outside of academic medicine.  Conflicts 
committees are rare or nonexistent.   Some IRBs review physician-investigator’s financial re-
lationships with the study sponsor, including compensation to the physician-investigator, but 
some do not.104     
FDA regulations require investigators to provide the sponsoring company with infor-
mation about their financial interests; sponsors must collect the information and ensure that 
conflicts are managed to protect the integrity of the data collected.105  Sponsoring companies 
may delegate this (and other) responsibilities to subcontractors called clinical or contract re-
search organizations (CROs).106  There are also subcontractors that assume investigators’ du-
ties, called site management organizations (SMOs); unlike CROs, they are not specifically 
authorized by regulation.  Unless and until the clinical trial results are submitted to the FDA 
as part of a marketing application, there is little or no review or oversight of conflicts reporting 
and management by investigators, SMOs, sponsors, and CROs.  
When research is conducted outside of academic medicine, the federally-mandated ethics 
review is most typically performed by an independent IRB.107  Independent IRBs are for-profit 
companies unaffiliated with industry sponsors or CROs.  They are widely believed to be more 
efficient than academic medical centers’ IRBs, but the quality and objectivity of independent 
IRBs varies; investigators, SMOs, sponsors, or CROs retain the IRB and have discretion as to 
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which IRB they choose to hire for each protocol reviewed.108  IRB accreditation exists but it is 
voluntary and only a handful of independent IRBs are accredited.109      
Research conducted outside of academic medicine but within general acute care or com-
munity hospitals may be reviewed by an in-house IRB, which may also assume jurisdiction 
over conflicts of interest.  A recent study of such hospitals found that 90% had policies and pro-
cedures in place requiring IRB review of the financial relationships between physician-inves-
tigators and research sponsors.110  However, the study also reported that most of the hospitals 
that reviewed per capita payments rarely rejected a research proposal for excessive payments 
due to the difficulty they faced in assessing reasonable or fair market value for the payments to 
investigators.111  The study also found that many physicians who practice in community hospi-
tals are not typically paid by the hospital and may be reluctant to divulge their personal finan-
cial information to the hospitals’ IRBs.  This problem also arises when research is conducted in 
physician offices and group practices; community-based physician-investigators are under no 
obligation to disclose their financial information to the independent IRB reviewing the study.
3.  Self-Regulation by Investigators
The Public Health Service (PHS) requires that institutions inform investigators about its 
conflict of interest regulations, the institution’s conflict of interest policy, and the investigator’s 
reporting responsibilities.112  The FDA’s regulations lack a comparable requirement, requiring 
only that investigators provide study sponsors with accurate, updated financial information 
(including any financial arrangements between the sponsor and the clinical investigator, sig-
nificant payments of other sorts from the sponsor of the covered study, proprietary interests 
in the tested product, and significant equity interest in the sponsor).113  The AAMC’s 2004 
study on implementation of its conflict of interest recommendations revealed that just half of 
the responding schools provided training on conflicts of interest.114  The lack of training for 
investigators is problematic because studies show that many physicians do not appreciate the 
risks posed by conflicts of interest, believing that industry compensation relationships might 
unduly influence their colleagues but not themselves.115 
Physicians are not of one mind about whether conflicts of interest adversely affect their 
judgment.  This ambivalence is reflected in the recent vote by the AMA to reject a proposal that 
the organization advise its members that it was ethically preferable for continuing medical edu-
cation not to be funded by industry.116  A chartering of a new advocacy organization, the Asso-
ciation for Clinical Researchers and Educators (ACRE), which seeks to advance collaboration 
with industry and its counterparts, further evidences the profession’s divide.117  ACRE decries 
“restrictive conflict of interest policies that often sever productive relationships between in-
dustry and physicians involved in clinical research and educational outreach.”118   Physicians 
in the community may be even less prepared than investigators in academic medicine to iden-
tify and address their own conflicts of interest.  Like their counterparts in academic medicine, 
they do not receive training in conflicts of interest.  Moreover, community physicians are less 
likely to have the knowledge and experience to conduct an independent review of the scientific 
merits of the trial protocol or of the ethical issues it might pose.119  Often, they regard ethical 
issues that arise as the sponsor’s responsibility and may have a poor understanding of how de-
cisions they make in the recruitment and enrollment process could affect participants’ interests 
and the integrity of the study findings.120
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GOvErNmENt rEGuLatiON aND OvErSiGHt
A.  Federal Law and Guidance
In 2000, the HHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that oversight of recruitment 
– both by the federal government and by local IRBs – was “minimal and largely unresponsive 
to emerging concerns.”121  Despite these findings, the regulation of recruitment and enrollment 
in clinical trials has still not changed significantly.122  The concerns to which the OIG referred 
included pressure to recruit participants quickly, which could potentially undermine the in-
formed consent process and lead to the enrollment of ineligible subjects.  These concerns are 
even more compelling today.  
Federal conflict of interest regulations govern most research conducted at academic 
medical centers as well as research in all settings involving drugs and devices that will be 
submitted to FDA for marketing approval.  The PHS’s conflicts of interest regulations govern 
institutions that apply for research funding from PHS agencies, including the NIH, as well as 
the investigators participating in the research.123  The FDA regulations cover clinical stud-
ies submitted in marketing applications for new drugs and biological products and marketing 
applications and reclassification petitions for medical devices.124  However, these regulations 
do not provide for oversight of all relationships between industry and research institutions 
and investigators.125  Moreover, even where FDA and PHS regulations do apply, they provide 
little guidance for investigators and industry regarding appropriate financial arrangements for 
clinical research.  States’ oversight of research on human subjects has been insufficient, and 
few, if any, states have distinct requirements for managing relationships between industry and 
investigators.126  
1.  PHS Regulations
PHS has issued conflicts of interest regulations that govern academic medical centers 
and other institutions that seek NIH and other federal government grants.127  Under these regu-
lations, grant-seeking institutions must require their investigators to disclose to the institutions 
“significant financial interests” “that would reasonably appear to be affected by the research 
for which PHS funding is sought” as well as significant financial interests “[i]n entities whose 
financial interests would reasonably appear to be affected by the research.”128  These disclo-
sures by investigators must be made annually, and updated when the institution applies for a 
grant and whenever the investigator incurs a new significant financial interest.129   
Significant financial interests include salary, royalties, or other payments (such as con-
sulting or speaking fees) to the investigator or the investigator’s spouse or dependent chil-
dren in excess of $10,000 and equity interests owned by the investigator or the investigator’s 
spouse or dependent children in excess of $10,000, or 5% of any single entity.130  Institutions 
are required to take steps to manage, reduce, or eliminate any conflict of interest posed by a 
significant financial interest and report to NIH or other agency that they have done so.131  The 
regulations do not require that institutions report the nature of a conflict of interest or other 
details in the first instance, but they must be prepared to provide the funding agency with such 
additional information upon request.132  
The PHS regulations list a number of mechanisms to manage conflicts, including 
monitoring by independent reviewers, modification of the research plan, disqualification from 
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participation in all or portion of the research, divestiture of significant financial interests, 
severance of relationships that create actual or potential conflicts, and public disclosure of 
significant financial interests.133  Notably, these requirements for identifying and managing 
conflicts apply only to investigator conflicts of interest.  No regulations currently govern 
institutional conflicts of interest.
On May 8, 2009, HHS issued a notice of proposed rulemaking seeking comment on 
possible amendments to these conflict of interest regulations.134  The nature and scope of the 
questions posed signal the potential for significant changes in current oversight of conflicts 
of interest.   HHS sought comments related to both the obligations assigned to institutions as 
well as the role of government agencies in overseeing conflicts of interest.135  In addition, HHS 
asked for feedback on various proposals to incorporate institutional conflicts of interest into 
the regulatory scheme, to enhance the identification and management of investigator conflicts 
by institutions, and to assure institutional compliance.
2.  HHS Guidance Statement
In 2004, the Department of Health and Human Services issued a guidance statement on 
“Financial Relationships and Interests in Research Involving Human Subjects: Guidance for 
Human Subject Protection” (the “Guidance Statement”).136  The Guidance Statement is non-
binding, and sets forth questions for IRBs, institutions, and investigators engaged in research 
to consider when determining: (i) whether specific financial relationships create financial 
interests that may adversely affect the rights and welfare of subjects, and (ii) how potential or 
actual financial conflicts of interest should be managed or eliminated.
More specifically, the Guidance Statement recommends that the IRBs, institutions, 
and investigators consider which procedures would be helpful in identifying and managing 
financial conflicts of interest for institutions and investigators, such as: i) collecting and evalu-
ating information regarding financial relationships related to research; ii) determining whether 
those relationships potentially cause a conflict of interest; and iii) determining the actions 
necessary to protect human subjects and ensure that those actions are taken.  The Guidance 
Statement suggests that the IRB, institution, or investigator identify the entity to examine 
individual and/or institutional financial relationships and interests, although it does not go as 
far as to recommend which entity should conduct the examination.  It also calls for consider-
ation of who should be educated regarding financial conflict of interest issues and policies.
Regarding institutional oversight specifically, the Guidance Statement suggests that in-
stitutions consider, among other things:  i) “[e]stablishing the independence of institutional 
responsibility for research activities from the management of the institution’s financial inter-
ests”; ii) “[e]stablishing conflict of interest committees (COICs) or identifying other bodies or 
persons and procedures” to manage or eliminate financial conflicts of interest; iii) “[e]stablish-
ing clear channels of communication between COICs and IRBs”; iv) “[i]ncluding individuals 
from outside the institution in the review and oversight of financial interests in research”; 
and v) “[e]stablishing policies regarding the types of financial relationships that may be held 
by parties involved in the research and circumstances under which those financial relation-
ships and interests may or may not be held.”137  The Guidance Statement also has specific 
recommendations for investigators in clinical research, instructing that they consider, among 
other things, “the kind, amount, and level of detail of information to be provided to research 
subjects regarding the source of funding, funding arrangements, financial interests of parties 
involved in the research, and any financial interest management techniques applied.”138
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3.  FDA Regulations 
Clinical trials of drugs and medical devices are regulated by the FDA, which has adopted 
a conflict of interest policy to require that steps are “taken in the design, conduct, reporting, 
and analysis of [clinical trials] to minimize bias.”139  The FDA obligates sponsors that submit 
marketing applications for drugs and devices to provide a list of the investigators who worked 
on “covered clinical stud[ies],” their financial interests as defined by the FDA, and the financial 
interests of their spouses and dependent children.140  Covered studies are those that the study 
sponsor or the “FDA relies on to establish that the product is effective… or any study in which 
a single investigator makes a significant contribution to the demonstration of safety.”141  FDA 
conflict of interest oversight would not in general extend to “phase 1 tolerance studies or phar-
macokinetic studies, most clinical pharmacology studies (unless they are critical to an efficacy 
determination), large open safety studies conducted at multiple sites, treatment protocols, and 
parallel track protocols,” or to post-approval trials that are not submitted in support of a supple-
mental marketing application.142  
As a general rule, the purpose of FDA’s oversight of financial interests is data integrity, 
not the protection of research participants.143  The FDA requires submission of conflict of 
interest information only for the subset of studies about which it has the most data integrity 
concerns, primarily those used to establish a product’s efficacy, and only after the studies are 
complete. 
For investigators conducting covered clinical studies, the FDA regulations require spon-
sors to disclose to the FDA the following financial interests: (1) compensation that could be 
influenced by the outcome of the clinical trial; (2) “significant payments of other sorts,” such as 
consulting or speaking fees, in excess of $25,000 from the sponsor to the investigator; (3) any 
proprietary interest, such as a patent or trademark, in the tested product; and (4) any “signifi-
cant equity interest” in the sponsor, defined to include equity in publicly-traded corporations 
in excess of $50,000 and equity in other entities that are not readily valued by reference to 
public prices.144  Notably, payments to cover “the costs of conducting the clinical study or other 
clinical studies” are expressly excluded from the definition of “significant payments of other 
sorts.”145  In addition to disclosing information about financial ties, the FDA requires research 
sponsors to report on steps taken to minimize the potential for bias.146  If an investigator’s 
disclosure raises data integrity questions, the FDA may audit the investigator’s data, require 
further analyses or studies, or refuse to use the entire clinical trial.147 
4.  Anti-Kickback Law
The federal Anti-Kickback law148 also has implications for the financial relationships 
of clinical investigators and manufacturers.  The Anti-Kickback law prohibits remuneration 
in exchange for patient referrals to health services covered by Medicare, Medicaid, and other 
federally-funded programs.  Specifically, the law bars any payment by an entity or individual to 
a physician for the purpose of inducing the physician to prescribe or use health care services re-
imbursed by a federal health program, including drugs and devices.149  The federal government 
and several courts have held that even if only one purpose of a payment is to induce referrals, 
the transaction violates the law.150  The Anti-Kickback law is a felony criminal statute which 
provides for criminal fines of up to $25,000 and prison terms of up to 5 years for each viola-
tion.  A separate statute provides for civil monetary penalties of up to $50,000 per violation.151 
Violators of the Anti-Kickback law also risk exclusion from participation in federal health 
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.152  In addition, they could be sued by the govern-
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ment or by a relator (an individual acting on the government’s behalf) under the civil False 
Claims Act (FCA), on the theory that “a claim induced by a kickback is a fraudulent claim.”153 
The FCA provides for treble damages.154  As demonstrated by prominent prosecutions and 
settlements, financial arrangements between physicians and industry can violate the Anti-Kick-
back law, including payments to physicians who serve as consultants, members of scientific 
advisory boards, or company speakers who are also prescribers of the company’s products.155
Congress and the OIG have designated “safe harbors” for payment and business practic-
es that, while potentially prohibited by the Anti-Kickback law, will not be prosecuted if every 
element of the safe harbor is met.156  Failure to fulfill each safe harbor element does not mean 
that an activity is illegal – it means that an entity does not receive the benefit of the promise 
of non-prosecution.  If an activity falls outside the safe harbor, the regulator or enforcement 
agency will employ its discretion to determine whether a statutory violation exists.157 
Recognizing that none of the safe harbors apply to clinical research, government regula-
tors have advised sponsors to hew as closely as possible to the law’s “personal services” safe 
harbor to avoid prosecution.158  The personal services safe harbor requires that a contract for 
professional services for a clinical trial must: (i) be in writing and signed by both parties; (ii) 
specify all of the services the physician is to provide, each of which must be “reasonably neces-
sary to accomplish the [agreement’s] commercially reasonable business purpose”; (iii) specify 
the precise amount of time the physician will spend and the precise amount to be paid for his 
or her time; (iv) last for at least a year; (v) provide for compensation that is “consistent with 
fair market value in arms-length transactions”; and (vi) not “take[] into account the volume or 
value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties for which payment 
may be made in whole or in part under Medicare or a State health care program.”159  The re-
quirement that the agreement specify the payment amount raises particular issues for clinical 
research, which frequently relies upon per capita or per enrollee payments.  With a per capita 
payment arrangement, it is difficult to set the global compensation in advance; while a trial 
likely has certain goals for the number of patients recruited, those goals may not be reached or 
may be exceeded.  Post-approval clinical trials, where the sponsor does not provide the study 
medication for free, could also fail to meet the safe harbor requirement that the amount the 
physician is paid be unrelated to the volume or value of business generated between the par-
ties.160  While per capita payments are common practice, they must be structured carefully to 
meet the other prongs of the safe harbor.161  
The OIG has also made clear that research contracts influenced by sales and marketing 
personnel are “particularly suspect.”162  The OIG has focused on post-FDA approval “studies,” 
suggesting that some are shams undertaken to induce physicians to use or prescribe the com-
pany’s drugs or devices, thereby violating the Anti-Kickback law.163  The OIG’s 2003 Com-
pliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers instructs that to “reduce risk, 
manufacturers should insulate research grant making from sales and marketing influences.”164 
It is critical that a study design have valid scientific goals and merit, rather than seek to achieve 
promotional purposes.165  
5.  Federal Guidance on Setting Fair Market Value
One linchpin of compliance with the Anti-Kickback law is compensation at fair market 
value (FMV).166  Although the OIG has issued Advisory Opinions167 addressing the applica-
tion of the Anti-Kickback law to physician compensation in contexts other than research, such 
as compensation paid by a hospital to a physician to be on-call, none contains detailed direc-
tion on calculating the fair market value of a physician-investigator’s research services, which 
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comprise both administrative and clinical tasks.  Companies have been cautioned not to rely on 
values that may encompass a bias to overcompensation.168  As applied to clinical research, this 
suggests that data on payment to physician-investigators for conducting clinical trials must be 
scrutinized to assure that the payments do not reflect physicians’ ability to generate business, 
either because they themselves are high prescribers or because they can affect the prescription 
practices of others.    
The Stark Law prohibiting physicians from referring patients to ancillary services in 
which the referring physician or a family member has a financial relationship169 and the federal 
law precluding tax-exempt organizations from providing an excess benefit to individuals in a 
position to influence the organization’s decisions170 also rely upon the concept of fair market 
value or reasonable compensation as a touchstone for compliance.  While these laws provide 
additional models of FMV, like the Anti-Kickback law, they do not establish a specific frame-
work or guidance on setting FMV for clinical research. 
The Stark Law defines the fair market value of, among other things, a physician’s per-
sonal services as “the value in arms length transactions, consistent with the general market 
value.”171  The regulations promulgated by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
(CMS) on exceptions to the general rule against physician self-referral elaborate on the defini-
tion, providing, 
“general market value” means… the compensation that would be included in a 
service agreement as the result of bona fide bargaining between well-informed 
parties to the agreement who are not otherwise in a position to generate business 
for the other party… Usually, the fair market price is… the compensation that has 
been included in bona fide service agreements with comparable terms at the time 
of the agreement, where the price or compensation has not been determined in 
any manner that takes into account the volume or value of anticipated or actual 
referrals.172  
Repealing earlier regulations that had sought to provide “bright line” rules for physician 
compensation,173  CMS advised in the Federal Register that fair market value determinations 
are ultimately subject to a facts and circumstances test, and that “[r]eference to multiple, ob-
jective, independently published salary surveys remains a prudent practice for evaluating fair 
market value;” it emphasized that any “commercially reasonable methodology” could be used, 
and that the appropriate methodology depends, inter alia, upon the nature of the transaction 
and location.174  CMS also noted that the fair market value of a physician’s services as an ad-
ministrator could differ from the fair market value of his or her clinical services.175 Notably, in 
the clinical trials context, physician-investigators often engage in both types of services.176 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations on “reasonable compensation” for an indi-
vidual who has “substantial influence” over a tax-exempt entity also incorporate the concept 
of fair market value and are therefore another potential source of guidance by analogy.  The 
IRS regulations establish a rebuttable presumption that the compensation paid by a tax-exempt 
organization is reasonable (and therefore does not jeopardize the organization’s tax exempt 
status or subject the individuals involved in the transaction to potential sanctions) if it is: (1) 
approved by a committee of individuals who do not themselves have a conflict of interest; (2) 
based on data regarding compensation of comparable individuals employed by comparable 
organizations; and (3) adequately documented.177  The IRS has also issued guidance on valu-
ing businesses, which some commentators have argued can be applied to setting physician 
compensation.178            
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Neither AdvaMed nor PhRMA provides instruction on how to determine payment levels 
for investigators beyond an admonition to comply with the Anti-Kickback Act.179  From the 
industry perspective, Pfizer’s “Policy on Compensation to Investigators in Clinical Trials” 
provides that “financial compensation must be reasonable relative to compensation for similar 
clinical studies sponsored by the pharmaceutical/biotechnology industry in the country where 
the research is conducted.”180   
6.  Physician Payments Sunshine Act
Building on the national outcry for greater transparency in the relationship of indus-
try and physicians, the Physician Payments Sunshine Act, pending federal legislation, would 
require disclosure of industry payments to physicians on a public website.  State legislatures 
have already taken the lead in this area of policy reform, with at least five states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia mandating disclosure of industry payments and Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
and Vermont also requiring that such payments be made public.181  There are also at least two 
states which require that information about a clinical trial’s funding be provided to prospective 
participants.182  
The Physician Payments Sunshine Act, which has received broad support from consum-
er, provider, and industry groups, would “provide for transparency in the relationship between 
physicians and manufacturers of drugs, devices, biologicals, or medical supplies for which 
payment is made under Medicare, Medicaid, or SCHIP.”183  In addition to bills introduced in 
the Senate in January 2009 and the House in July 2009, there are several other versions of the 
Act, as it has been incorporated into the various health reform bills and proposals.184  Under 
all versions, manufacturers would be required to report payments or other transfers of value 
made to a physician.185  They would also be required to report the physician’s name, address, 
and specialty, the form and nature of the payment, and, if the payment is related to a particu-
lar drug, the name of the drug.  The information would be posted on a website searchable by 
physician and location, in a manner that is clear and understandable, and easy to aggregate and 
download.186  This website would serve as a valuable resource to policy-makers, prosecutors, 
and others with an interest in industry-physician financial relationships, although it would not 
substitute for investigators’ disclosure of their financial ties directly to their institutions or 
to prospective research participants.  Under certain versions of the Act, funding for clinical 
research and payments made pursuant to product development agreements would not be dis-
closed until after the clinical trial has been completed.187 
 
B. Government Oversight
1.  The Failure of Administrative Agency Oversight
Government regulation of financial incentives for clinical trial recruitment and enroll-
ment is poorly enforced.188  Recent government investigations reveal that neither the NIH nor 
FDA is adequately enforcing extant conflict of interest regulations.  A January 2009 OIG 
report concluded, among other findings, that: (i) the FDA does not routinely review financial 
information as part of its onsite inspections; (ii) the FDA cannot determine whether it has 
financial information for all clinical investigators because it does not have a complete list of 
investigators; (iii) when financial interests are disclosed, the FDA responds inconsistently, if 
at all; and (iv) 42% of marketing applications approved by the FDA were missing required 
financial information.189  
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Likewise, a January 2008 OIG report leveled similar criticisms at the NIH, finding that: 
(i) NIH could not provide an accurate count of the conflict of interest reports it received from 
2004 to 2006; (ii) NIH did not know what type of conflicts existed because for the most part 
grantee institutions’ disclosures included no details; and (iii) NIH follow up on reported con-
flicts was inconsistent and infrequent.190   
2.  Enforcement Actions and Settlement Agreements 
Over the course of the past six months, federal and state prosecutors have focused their 
attention on the arena of clinical research, bringing major enforcement actions that seek to 
change particular company practices and, in the case of the prosecution in New Jersey against 
the Synthes Corporation, to effect reform of payment practices.  While these cases have yield-
ed important results and signal a mounting government focus on misconduct in research, they 
cannot provide the kind of systemic change or prospective guidance needed to frame federal 
policy on recruitment and enrollment or conflicts of interest.  Moreover, enforcement actions 
identify specific investigator and institutional behaviors that the government deems illegal, but 
do not articulate best practices generally.191 
The enforcement action that most clearly sought to achieve broader reform was the case 
brought by the New Jersey Attorney General against Synthes.  Many physicians who had con-
ducted clinical research on the Synthes device ProDisc, an artificial spinal disk approved by 
the FDA in 2006, stood to benefit financially if the device gained FDA approval.192  In May 
2009, the New Jersey Attorney General entered into a settlement agreement with Synthes, 
ProDisc’s manufacturer.193  The Attorney General alleged that Synthes had violated the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act by compensating physician-investigators with company stock and 
failing to disclose physician-investigators’ financial interests to the FDA, as required by fed-
eral regulations.  Under the settlement agreement, Synthes must submit all financial interest 
information, as defined in the FDA’s conflict of interest regulations, to the IRB as part of each 
clinical investigator’s initial IRB submission packet and/or request for approval.  Through 
its contracts with clinical investigators, Synthes must obligate investigators to disclose their 
financial interests to research participants, if so required by the IRB reviewing the clinical tri-
al.194  When the FDA approves a Synthes device for marketing, the company must also disclose 
any physician-investigator financial interests to the general public via its website.  Finally, the 
settlement agreement bars the company from reimbursing investigators with stock.195  Con-
cluding that the practice of compensating investigators with stock creates an “unacceptable 
conflict of interest,” the Attorney General called upon federal regulators to address the practice 
at the national level.  Recently, the New Jersey Attorney General has also launched investiga-
tions into the financial interests of investigators who performed studies for the device makers 
DePuy Orthopaedics and Medtronic.196
In a 2008 settlement, Biovail Pharmaceuticals pled guilty to federal kickback and con-
spiracy charges for using sham studies to obtain physician loyalty to their product.197  Specifi-
cally, Biovail used a “study,” called the PLACE Program, as a mechanism to pay physicians to 
prescribe or recommend the drug Cardizem, L.A. to control high blood pressure.  The Program 
essentially required participating physicians to prescribe Cardizem, L.A. to a cohort of patients 
about whom the prescriber would then complete two short multiple choice surveys over three 
patient visits. The physicians’ payment was based upon the number of patients enrolled in the 
cohort and completion of the questionnaires – the more patients for whom the physician pre-
scribed Cardizem, L.A., the more money the physician received from the manufacturer.  The 
U.S. Attorney for Massachusetts determined that the payments of up to one thousand dollars 
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exceeded the fair market value of the medical prescribers’ time necessary for the required 
tasks, assuming the study was even valid.  Furthermore, the U.S. Attorney alleged that the pro-
gram was not designed or implemented in a way to provide new or meaningful scientific data 
about Cardizem, L.A., but solely to increase the number of prescriptions generated.
3.  Lawsuits and Settlements 
Research participants who believe they have been harmed by investigator conflicts of 
interest have limited legal recourse.  Courts have held that injured research participants cannot 
assert a claim for violation of the federal regulations designed to protect them,198 but, in some 
cases, have allowed state law claims to proceed for lack of informed consent where the investi-
gator stood to benefit financially from the positive outcome of a clinical investigation in which 
he or she is involved – e.g., where the investigator had money riding on the outcome – and the 
plaintiff was not informed of the conflict prior to consenting to participate.  
For example, in Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Center, the estates and surviving 
relatives of deceased cancer patients who had participated in a clinical trial sued the Fred 
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center (the Hutch) and researchers, asserting that the defendants’ 
failure to disclose the risks of trial participation and the financial interests of the Hutch and 
researchers involved in the study violated the rights of trial participants.199  The clinical trial 
tested use of a monoclonal antibody to reduce the risk of graft-versus-host disease in bone mar-
row transplant recipients.200  In fact, the antibody caused graft rejections, cancer relapses, and 
new cancers, which the plaintiffs alleged caused premature death in trial participants.  Accord-
ing to a Seattle Times exposé, the Hutch had licensed the commercial rights to the antibody 
being studied to a start-up company called Genetic Systems but retained a royalty interest.201 
The Hutch and the three researchers involved in the trial also held stock in Genetic Systems. 
In addition, one of the researchers had a seat on the Genetic Systems’ scientific advisory board, 
another was employed as the company’s medical director in addition to working for the Hutch, 
and the third was a consultant to the company. 
The District Court for the Western District of Washington rejected the plaintiffs’ federal 
claims for violation of rights arising from the regulations governing human subject research 
as well as the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki,202 but allowed the state law 
fraud and informed consent claims to proceed to trial.203  The court ultimately rejected the 
fraud claim based on failure to prove the existence of the financial conflicts asserted.204  On the 
issue of informed consent, the jury found for the defendants, concluding that the participants 
had given their consent, and that a reasonably prudent fully informed person in their position 
would have made the choice to participate in the clinical trial.205
In another significant case, the court agreed to hear claims based in gross negligence and 
deceit where a hospital and physician-investigator failed to disclose a financial interest in the 
outcome of clinical research.  In May 1999, Roger Darke died in a VEGF-2 gene therapy pro-
gram conducted by Dr. Jeffrey Isner, chief of cardiovascular research at St. Elizabeth’s Medical 
Center, within twenty-four hours of undergoing surgery in which the therapy was delivered. 
His widow brought suit against the hospital and doctors, alleging that had Darke known that 
a previous patient had died, and of the financial interests of the hospital and the physician-
investigator, he would not have participated in the experimental program.206  Neither Isner nor 
the hospital disclosed to Darke or his wife, as part of the informed consent process, that, “if 
the gene therapy program was successful,” they both “stood to profit financially in proportion 
to their ownership stake” in a company called Vascular Genetics.207  At the time the suit was 
filed, Isner and his heirs owned 20% of Vascular Genetics, which Isner helped found in 1997 to 
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support the experimental gene therapy treatment for coronary artery disease that he developed 
(the defendant hospital also owned 20%).  The complaint alleged that Darke “was intentionally 
and maliciously treated as a human guinea pig in order to generate great financial profits for all 
defendants.”208  In June 2004, a Massachusetts Superior Court held that the doctor and hospital 
could be held liable for failing to disclose, as part of the informed consent process, their finan-
cial interests in the treatment that they recommended.209
In May 2005, the same court denied the Isner Estate’s210 motion for summary judgment 
on Darke’s gross negligence claim, holding that enough evidence had been presented to sup-
port the allegation that Isner’s financial stake in the success of the gene therapy treatment may 
have compromised how the clinical trial was conducted.211  It also held that there was sufficient 
evidence to go forward with a deceit claim, for failure to disclose the financial relationships to 
Darke and his wife.212
Although it did not see the inside of a courthouse, one of the most well-known informed 
consent cases involved the death of an 18-year old volunteer with ornithine transcarbamylase 
deficiency, Jesse Gelsinger, who died during his participation in a gene transfer study at the 
University of Pennsylvania.  The lawsuit brought by his father against the university and inves-
tigators alleged that the investigators committed fraud by not revealing that a co-investigator, 
the University, and other university officials had financial relationships with Genovo, a bio-
technology company, and stood to gain financially from the successful use of RDAd vectors.213 
The Complaint also alleged that the investigators had failed to inform Jesse of the risks of the 
study, that they had failed to inform Jesse or the FDA of adverse events experienced by other 
participants in the same trial as well as the death of monkeys in an earlier animal study, and 
that the investigators had allowed Jesse to participate in the study despite not meeting the 
inclusion criteria due to the fact that his liver was not functioning within the study’s 24-hour 
limit.214  Jesse Gelsinger’s father learned that a “principal investigator, James Wilson, owned 
stock in... [the] company [he had] founded, which contributed $4 million per year to human 
gene therapy research at the University . . . where the experiment took place,” and claimed that 
had Gelsinger known about these financial interests, “he would not have [participated] in the 
research study.”215  The suit ended in a confidential settlement in 2000, six weeks after it was 
filed.  In 2005, the University of Pennsylvania and Children’s National Medical Center agreed 
to pay over $1 million in a False Claims Act settlement with the federal government, brought 
by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to resolve allegations 
that the institutions failed to disclose necessary information and misled the government about 
the benefits of the treatment (the three physician-investigators – including Wilson – were also 
parties to the settlement).216  The federal investigation following Jesse Gelsinger’s death showed 
that Wilson withheld more information from the Gelsingers than just his financial interests, 
including prior negative test results.217  
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tHE rOaD tO rEFOrm
A. Preliminary Observations
Research is critical to the advancement of medical treatment and health.  It must be 
structured to produce high quality data that facilitates the assessment of safety and efficacy in 
the population for whom the treatment will be used.  The good of the enterprise requires that 
the clinical trial system sufficiently balance the costs and benefits to physicians and prospec-
tive trial participants to ensure the continued sufficient supply of researchers and subjects.  The 
system must also be imbued with actual and perceived integrity – so that it produces scientifi-
cally reliable results, participants are safe, and people trust the system sufficiently to be willing 
to participate.  
Clinical trial enrollment and recruitment practices are critical to protecting the rights 
and interests of enrollees as well as the scientific integrity of research.  Potential enrollees are 
at risk if the process entails poor compliance with inclusion and exclusion criteria, inadequate 
informed consent, or pressure to enter or remain in a clinical trial.  As reflected in government 
prosecutions and prominent cases that have come to light, these risks are exacerbated by finan-
cial incentives provided to investigators or institutions that may undermine their role as trust-
worthy gatekeepers of clinical research.  In the current economic climate, potential enrollees 
are also more vulnerable as increasing numbers of individuals seek to participate in research 
either as a primary means of access to treatment or as a form of income. 
Several premises that drove our analysis merit discussion as a preamble to our recom-
mendations.  Conflicts of interest in research are inevitable and do not in themselves signal un-
ethical behavior – the goal is to eliminate those conflicts that pose excessive risk of distortion 
in judgment to the detriment of the study or research participant, which would be unethical, 
and reduce or manage those conflicts that pose a lesser degree of risk to avoid such distortions 
of judgment.218  
A general principle upon which our recommendations rest is that economic neutrality 
should prevail in compensation for research and reimbursement for treatment.  Such a principle 
should eliminate the conflicts of interest that arise when the potential profit on research is so 
great that it may distort physicians’ judgments to the potential detriment of their patients.  This 
scenario arises most frequently in one of two ways – when the physician/investigator has some 
kind of investment whose value will increase with a successful trial outcome and when the 
physician/investigator’s compensation for oversight of a patient in a trial well exceeds what the 
physician would be reimbursed if the patient continues treatment.    
Physicians, lawyers, and ethicists alike generally agree that the opportunity to profit 
through an equity interest in the product that is subject to trial should be avoided entirely or 
in all but the most extraordinary of circumstances, in which case research subjects should be 
informed of these interests.  Furthermore, fair market valuations of physician time should be 
comparable on an hourly or global basis to compensation for clinical work, to avoid the poten-
tial that research is more lucrative than treatment, and the attendant risk that such differences 
in compensation could factor into physician judgment.219  This is particularly important be-
cause of the frequency with which physicians are referring their own patients to clinical trials, 
which also increases the likelihood of the therapeutic misconception on the part of patients/
participants. 
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An overall bias of this section is that conflicts of interest in research are best addressed 
through the regulatory process, rather than through prosecutorial enforcement of laws such as 
the Anti-Kickback law.             
B. Taking Stock: Current Oversight
As evidenced throughout this White Paper, the world of clinical research has changed in 
dramatic ways, but government oversight has not kept pace.  Oversight and guidance of both 
investigator conflicts of interest and the recruitment, enrollment, and retention practices such 
conflicts could potentially influence is inadequate.  Reporting by institutions to government 
of investigator conflicts occurs only after the research has been initiated or conducted, with 
inadequate information about the nature of the conflict or specific steps taken to eliminate or 
minimize the conflict in order to protect participants and research integrity. Current federal 
regulations fail to address institutional financial interests that could give rise to a conflict.
Institutional oversight, which exists primarily in academic medical centers, is also in-
adequate; within academic medicine, policies are not comprehensive; and faculty as well as 
institutional compliance with policies has been highly variable.220  Community hospitals by 
and large do not have conflicts committees to identify and manage conflicts, and IRBs lack 
the guidance, expertise, and in some cases, the information to execute this role effectively.221 
Further, for research conducted by individual physicians, physician groups, or private research 
institutes, no consensus exists among physicians about what comprises a conflict of interest 
and whether conflicts of interest present ethical dilemmas; most physicians deny that their own 
behavior is affected by conflicts of interest.222  Finally, there is simply no extant mechanism 
either to gather information about compensation for clinical trials and other financial relation-
ships between the sponsors and investigators, or to address any conflicts of interest that could 
influence recruitment and enrollment prior to commencement, much less completion, of the 
trial.
C. Government Reform
Government should undertake certain basic reforms to raise physician awareness about 
conflicts of interest, to bar forms of compensation for research that generate the greatest risk 
to participants, to provide guidance for managing other forms of compensation and financial 
interests held by investigators and institutions, and to increase transparency among all of the 
stakeholders involved with any particular trial.  Government must also enhance its oversight of 
the recruitment, enrollment and retention practices attendant to clinical research, seeking more 
information about the conflicts at an earlier stage of the research process. 
1.  Compensation for Research
Per Capita Payments and Global Payments.  Payments per enrollee (“per capita pay-
ments”) or global payment for the research project are common forms of reimbursement for 
clinical trials for research conducted within academic medicine and in community settings. 
While per capita payments create a direct incentive to recruit individual enrollees, the incen-
tive is not problematic as long as the payment is not excessive.  Likewise, global payments are 
an important vehicle to fund research as long as the amount of payment is appropriate and the 
calculation to determine compensation is well-delineated. 
Current federal policy for per capita and global payments, although requiring FMV valu-
ation, does not provide sufficient guidance about the methodology or principles by which fair 
market value for research compensation should be determined.223  Federal and state policy 
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statements, developed in the context of anti-kickback laws, are the primary regulations that 
guide FMV for research compensation. HHS should provide prospective, clear guidance for 
FMV in the context of clinical research. 
Under the broad umbrella of the concept of FMV, businesses and personal services can 
be valued in different ways, including: (i) the classic economic formulation of whatever a will-
ing buyer and willing seller agree upon in an arms-length negotiation; (ii) the average price set 
by the market of similarly situated buyers and sellers; or (iii) a calculation of projected costs.224 
In the research setting, costs could include the cost of services provided by physicians, nurses 
and others, tests, procedures, and drugs, devices, and materials, staff training, the informed 
consent process, data collection, and adverse event reporting. 
In the arena of financial relationships between industry and physicians, the first meth-
odology has often yielded excessive payments for honoraria, travel, consulting fees, speakers 
bureau and advisory board participation, and other activities; these excessive payments have 
been widely recognized as a means to influence physicians’ decisions about prescribing, rec-
ommendations by opinion leaders in the context of medical education, and physicians’ con-
clusions in published study results.  As highlighted by prominent prosecutions, payment for 
research – particularly for post-market “seeding” studies – may also be designed primarily to 
influence prescribing patterns.225  Overall, the payments for services to physicians, particularly 
in Phase IV trials that are most vulnerable to abuse as seeding studies, may have been inflated 
to yield a “market” result that encompasses the potential to influence referrals and change 
practice patterns.  For this reason, neither the free market model of exchange between willing 
sellers and buyers nor the prices set by the aggregate of such transactions for particular types 
of studies should be used as the benchmark to set compensation for clinical research.
We recommend that the benchmark for compensation for physician services for research 
should be comparable payment for time and services for treatment.  This will compensate 
physicians fairly for their time and services, and will assure that there are no hidden bonuses 
or incentives for physicians to recruit patients into research or to refer them to research rather 
than treatment.  The determination of compensation should take into account factors such as 
geographic region, years in practice, board certification, and specialty.226  Significantly too, in 
order to avoid a disincentive for physicians to conduct research, the calculation of compensa-
tion for a clinical trial should include delineated reimbursement for all other expenses, includ-
ing tests or interviews to screen patients, time seeking informed consent, tracking of enrollee 
participation, and data collection and reporting.  Within academic medicine, the infrastructure 
is in place to undertake these responsibilities; for physicians in the community the costs may 
be different due to the need to hire staff to undertake these responsibilities or the need for phy-
sicians to perform certain tasks themselves.  It is appropriate for per capita payments to include 
a factor for start up costs such as study design, patient recruitment, and staff training incurred, 
before participants are enrolled.
To accomplish this end, HHS should issue regulations that require payment neutrality 
as between treatment and research.  The regulations should set forth a guiding principle that 
physicians and institutions should be fairly compensated for all legitimate aspects of research 
while avoiding payments that are excessive and may exert an undue influence on participant 
recruitment or other aspects of the clinical trials.  In addition, federal guidelines should iden-
tify any expenses that are not permissible, provide guidance about factors such as geography 
and specialty that may be considered in setting FMV compensation, and require that the FMV 
calculation for per capita and global payments be set forth in writing. 
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Setting Limits – Other Payment Methodologies for Research. Per capita and global 
payments are acceptable approaches to compensate health care professionals and institutions 
for research.  However, other methods of compensation create a direct conflict between the 
financial interests of investigators and the interests of potential participants and should be 
prohibited by federal regulation. 
Finder’s Fees. Professional organizations have rejected finder’s fees as ethically unac-
ceptable.227  These fees comprise payments to physicians, nurses, medical students and other 
participants in the research project solely for referring individuals to participate in a trial. 
While the frequency of such fees is debated, a recent survey of clinical research coordinators 
found that such fees are still used.228
HHS should bar any payment solely for a referral to a research trial as well as any pay-
ment methodology for screening potential participants or other services that conditions pay-
ment on the individual enrolling in the trial.  Under this formulation, payment for screening 
participants on medical and psychosocial grounds could be reimbursed at FMV provided that 
the payment is made regardless of whether the person decides to enroll in the trial or is eligible 
to participate once screening tests and analysis are performed.  Fees solely for the referral cre-
ate an incentive to refer individuals regardless of whether they are appropriate for the study, 
a risk that is especially problematic when physicians with a long-term relationship with their 
patients refer them to research.  Moreover, given that Medicare and Medicaid pay for the tests 
and elements of research that are standard treatment, finder’s fees are likely to violate the fed-
eral and state Anti-Kickback laws, although this may not be well-understood by health care 
professionals.229
Bonuses for Recruitment and Retention.  Like finder’s fees, bonuses for recruiting a 
certain number of participants, meeting research recruitment goals in a particular timeframe, 
or retaining patients, create a direct conflict of interest by incentivizing physicians to recruit 
and retain individual patients to meet the bonus quotas or goals.  The federal government 
should articulate the risks to potential enrollees and bar these forms of payment in research.
Payment with Equity. Payment of physicians who conduct research with equity in the 
research sponsor gives physicians a financial interest in the outcome of the clinical trial, creat-
ing significant risks both to enrollees and to the scientific integrity of the research.  The federal 
government should prohibit this form of payment to physicians and other researchers, those in 
positions to affect the conduct of the research, or to entities conducting the research.230
2.  Addressing Other Conflicts of Interest in Research
In addition to federal guidance for compensation for research, the current framework 
for federal policy to oversee investigators’ conflicts of interest should be revised to specify 
conflicts that will disqualify a researcher from serving as an investigator.  Further, regula-
tions should enumerate requirements for identifying and managing other conflicts arising from 
the varied and frequent financial relationships between industry and physicians.  Apart from 
payment for research, drug, device, and biotechnology companies that sponsor research may 
also provide other funding or remuneration to investigators, including honoraria for speaking 
engagements, consulting fees, payment for travel time and expenses, payment for service on 
an advisory board, and compensation for their intellectual contributions in the form of equity 
holdings or ownership rights in products (for example, royalty, patent, or license rights).
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As proposed by the AAMC and most recently by the IOM Committee, holdings by inves-
tigators or their immediate family members231 that provide a direct interest in the outcome of 
the research, such as stock or stock options in a privately held company or equity in a publicly 
traded company above a de minimis amount, should be barred absent a compelling rationale 
to permit the conflict.232  The same policy should apply to intellectual property interests in a 
drug, device or other product investigated by the clinical trial.  These holdings by investigators 
or their immediate family members give them a personal direct stake in the outcome of the 
research, which creates both the appearance of improper influence and the risk that the finan-
cial benefits, which can be substantial, could adversely affect both the interests of enrollees as 
well as the scientific integrity of the research.  Only in circumstances where the research could 
not be conducted effectively or safely without the individual’s participation, should an excep-
tion be allowed.233 Such cases presumably will be rare, arising, for example, when a physician 
has designed a device and is needed to consult on the surgical procedures for its implantation. 
In such instances, the physician should serve as a consultant rather than an investigator, and 
should not participate in key aspects of the research, including recruitment and enrollment, 
informed consent, and data collection and analysis.  Instead, the physician should provide his 
or her technical expertise without playing other significant roles, as detailed in a written plan 
for managing the conflict.  Moreover, where such intellectual property holdings are allowed, 
the FDA should be notified of the conflict, as well as the plan to reduce and manage it, prior to 
the commencement of research.  
Service by a physician-investigator or immediate family members on the board of di-
rectors or as an officer of the company that sponsors the research or holds equity interests or 
ownership rights should also bar the physician-investigator  from participating in the research, 
unless his or her technical expertise is essential to involvement as a consultant, as discussed 
above.  Physician-investigators who play other leadership roles in privately-held, smaller 
corporations, including service on an advisory board or speakers bureau, or as a consultant, 
should also be barred from participating in the research, absent compelling circumstances in 
which participation should be limited to a consultant capacity, with prior notice to the FDA. 
Frequently, small closely-held companies are created to spin off the product research portion 
of an investigator’s scientific work.  These companies typically have a substantial stake in the 
outcome of the research through ownership rights in the product. 
For publicly-held corporations, service on an advisory board or other financial relation-
ships with the sponsor may also give rise to conflicts that must be addressed, although they 
fall short of requiring a ban on the relationship.  Instead, conflicts committees should carefully 
scrutinize and evaluate the nature and longevity of the service and the amount of payments 
both historically and going forward in determining how to manage the conflict, and the federal 
government should adopt a mechanism for auditing such situations. 
D. Enhancing Institutional Oversight of Conflicts of Interest
While government regulation can and should set policy parameters and direction and 
establish an effective audit process, institutional oversight of conflicts of interest will remain 
the primary vehicle to identify and manage conflicts of interest held by investigators and the 
institutions themselves.  As reflected in recent congressional investigations and studies of insti-
tutional practice, a gap exists between recommended practices and policy adoption and adher-
ence within academic medical centers.234  It is clear that academic medical centers have also 
fallen short in implementing reporting policies effectively through the creation of systems to 
collect information about investigator interests and to monitor compliance by investigators. 
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Institutional efforts to track investigators’ financial relationships with industry will no doubt 
be enhanced by passage of national legislation requiring public reporting of physician/indus-
try financial relationships.  Public disclosure of payments by industry to physicians will be 
especially valuable in addressing conflicts of interest outside of academic medicine, where no 
system exists to report on conflicts of interest until after the research has been completed.
As reflected in studies of current practices and government investigations, financial re-
lationships between industry and physician-investigators are prevalent, including payment for 
honoraria, consulting, travel, and continuing medical education.235  Institutions should evalu-
ate each of these relationships to determine if the magnitude and form of the payment, the 
longevity of the relationship, or other factors suggest that the physician’s relationship with the 
sponsor should be terminated or renegotiated or that the conflict of interest compels a different 
role for the physician in prospective research involving that sponsor.
1.  Addressing Investigator Conflicts of Interest within Academic Medicine:  
   Challenges and Solutions  
Federal regulations as well as recommendations by the AAMC, the AAU and, most 
recently, the IOM provide a framework and guidance for institutional oversight of investigator 
conflicts of interests within academic medical centers.  Under PHS guidelines, institutions are 
required to take steps to manage, reduce or eliminate any conflict of interest posed by a finan-
cial interest that meets the definition of “significant.”  However, the regulations do not obligate 
investigators to report all financial interests to the institution, do not require a written plan to 
manage all interests deemed to create a conflict, and do not require that the institution report 
the nature or extent of the conflict to PHS.  Nor do the regulations state a process for review, 
substantive limits on the kinds of conflicts that may exist, or a required minimum response for 
conflicts that pose the greatest risks to participants and the integrity of the research. 
Appropriately, HHS has sought recommendations to tighten and revise federal require-
ments for such oversight.236  In particular, the Request for Comments issued by HHS in May 
2009 sought comments on a wide range of issues, including: (i) whether certain financial in-
terests should be automatically reported to the institution rather than leave it up to each inves-
tigator to determine if the interests would “reasonably appear to be affected by the research”; 
(ii) whether all interests should be reviewed by an institutional committee; (iii) whether in-
stitutions should be required to create special conflicts of interest committees to review the 
information and make recommendations; and (iv) whether the regulations should bar certain 
conflicts or specify how they must be managed.
We recommend that investigators should be required to report all financial interests to an 
institutional committee for review regardless of the amount of the interests, rather than leav-
ing it up to investigators to determine if the interest could reasonably be expected to affect the 
research.  In fact, in order to be effective, institutions need to establish an internal database 
that investigators must update as information changes about their financial relationships with 
for-profit entities. While aggregating the information for all potential investigators is a massive 
undertaking for academic medical centers, it is the only effective means to address potential 
conflicts of interest proactively. 
Federal policy should require that a committee review and manage conflicts of interest, 
and should specify requirements for the committee’s expertise and obligations.  The issue of 
whether a special conflicts of interest committee should be created to review and manage the 
conflicts is complex, and should be left up to the judgment of individual institutions.  On the 
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one hand, a separate committee could bring additional expertise in financial arrangements. 
IRBs often lack this experience because they are often heavily comprised of clinicians.  Con-
flicts committees may be farther removed from the clinicians whose research proposals are 
reviewed by the IRB.  As a result, they may be more objective or more willing to act on con-
flicts that create either the appearance of a conflict or a risk of undue influence that may not be 
identified by clinicians immersed in research themselves.  On the negative side of the equation, 
conflicts committees add a separate organizational structure and step to a process already 
criticized as too slow.  If given additional resources, at least some IRBs could no doubt handle 
the additional responsibility in a process that is more streamlined.  Giving IRBs the respon-
sibility for managing conflicts, rather than creating a separate committee, may be especially 
valuable at community hospitals that do not conduct extensive research.  In order to carry out 
the responsibility of overseeing conflicts of interest, IRBs could create a subcommittee that 
comprises individuals with financial expertise.  If a separate conflicts committee is charged 
to address conflicts of interest, information about investigator conflicts for particular clinical 
trials should be reported to the IRB to inform its review of the proposed clinical trial as well 
as its obligation to review informed consent documents.  
Finally, federal regulations bar any member of the IRB who has a “conflicting interest” 
from participating in review of a protocol.237  With guidance set by federal regulation, IRB 
policies should clearly delineate the interests that would be deemed “conflicting,” encompass-
ing the broad array of financial relationships between industry and physicians. 
2.  Addressing Institutional Conflicts of Interest within Academic  
   Medical Centers
As recognized in the recent IOM Committee report, institutional conflicts of interest 
have received far less scrutiny and attention from policymakers and others than the conflicts of 
investigators.238  Nonetheless, the recommendations of the AAMC and AAU provide important 
guidance, proposing that institutional conflicts, like investigator conflicts, should be identified, 
reviewed, and as needed, managed or eliminated.  Significantly, the AAMC and AAU recom-
mendations establish a rebuttable presumption that the institution should not conduct research 
if a conflict exists due to the financial interests of the institution or those in key leadership 
positions such as deans, department chairs, and division heads.239  Noting that institutional 
officers, such as the chief executive officer or the officers who oversee grants or technology 
transfer, may have an interest in strengthening the financial performance of the institution, the 
IOM Committee proposed that a committee or subcommittee of the board of directors should 
be charged to oversee the conflicts because of the board’s fiduciary duty to the institution and 
greater distance from day-to-day management.
We agree with the IOM recommendation that a committee of the board of directors 
should oversee institutional conflicts of interest in research. Members who serve on the com-
mittee should be independent of management.  The board committee’s oversight should extend 
beyond the primary institutions, such as the medical school or university, to any not-for-profit 
institutes or for-profit corporate entities that are substantially controlled by or operate under 
the auspices of the medical school or university.  These entities may receive substantial grants 
from industry or hold equity and property interests in the products studied in clinical trials 
by these entities or by the university or medical school. They also may have a small board of 
directors personally invested in or identified with the financial success of the entity. 
The board committee charged to oversee institutional conflicts should produce general 
conflict of interest policies that are available to all, both within and outside the institution; 
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ideally, they should be posted on the institution’s website.  Like the committee that manages 
investigator conflicts, the board committee should report its findings and conclusions regard-
ing any particular investigator or proposed trial to the IRB.  As with management of investiga-
tor conflicts, effectively overseeing institutional conflicts will depend in the first instance on 
capturing the relevant interests across the many parts of the institution where they may arise: 
the office of technology transfer, the development office, the grants office, grants to individual 
departments or their chairs, and the holdings of executive management. 
3.  Overseeing Conflicts of Interest in the Community Setting
In community settings, FDA and PHS require sponsors and investigators to be respon-
sible for the review and management of investigator conflicts of interest prior to the time that 
research begins.  Independent IRBs do not necessarily see conflicts review as part of their 
responsibilities, and, as with the rest of the IRB process, no government agency reviews IRB 
decisions at the time they are made to ensure that the IRB is acting appropriately.  Institutional 
conflicts of interest are unregulated.  We recommend that the FDA and PHS regulations be 
revised to set forth guidelines for the process and substance of conflicts of interest review in 
community settings.  Such regulations would need to include a provision requiring physicians 
to make relevant financial information available for review.
Outside of academic medicine, private research institutes, companies that sponsor re-
search, or CROs or SMOs retained by the sponsor, oversee the conduct of research projects.  By 
and large, conflicts committees do not exist to review potential conflicts held by the investiga-
tor or the entity, such as a physicians group, conducting the research. The sponsor, or a CRO or 
SMO acting as its agent, is ill-suited to review conflicts of interest that are generated through 
either the means or magnitude of payment for research or by other financial relationships with 
investigators. 
IRBs, whether independent or based in a community hospital or other facility, should be 
charged with the review of conflicts of interest held by investigators and entities conducting re-
search in community settings.  IRBs could create a separate committee on conflicts of interest 
with appropriate expertise to establish policies for the IRB’s conflicts review.  Alternatively, 
conflicts committees acting as a subcommittee of the IRB or as a separate committee could re-
view individual protocols.  Reviewing conflicts of interest and formulating recommendations 
about managing the conflicts is a substantial additional responsibility that should be reflected 
in additional fees for protocol review to assure that IRBs have the resources to undertake this 
task. 
Assigning this responsibility to independent IRBs is an imperfect solution; but it is also 
the only possible avenue that could serve this function.  As commentators have pointed out, 
sponsors or CROs and SMOs acting on their behalf can manipulate the system of IRB review 
by choosing IRBs that have a reputation or practice for lax review.240  Independent IRBs are 
for-profit entities; some may place the financial success of the entity above the need to devote 
extensive resources to thorough review of each protocol.  At the same time, other commenta-
tors have noted that independent IRBs often operate more efficiently than IRBs in academic 
medicine; the IRB membership is smaller, the meetings are more frequent, the members are 
compensated for their time, in contrast to their counterparts in academic medicine, and a 
stream of revenue supports the activity.  In addition, IRBs in academic medicine and com-
munity hospitals face their own distinct pressures, including the fact that the IRB members 
are reviewing the research proposals of their peers and colleagues, and serve on the IRB in 
addition to their other responsibilities.
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Federal regulations should provide clear guidance to IRBs about the nature and scope 
of information they should review, the standards for the review, and the alternatives for elimi-
nating, minimizing, or managing a conflict.  This guidance should apply to conflicts of inter-
est facing both investigators and institutions, such as physician groups and private research 
institutes.  By and large, federal regulations and policies should be similar for IRBs within 
and outside academic medicine.  As with academic medicine, institutional conflicts of interest 
should be broadly defined to include both financial interests held by the institution as well as 
financial interests of leadership within the institution and their spouses and children.  In addi-
tion, since physician practices and research centers or institutes are far smaller in terms of size 
and diversity of revenue, revenues from the sponsor for research or for any other purpose that 
exceed a specified threshold of the overall revenue of the entity should preclude the site from 
participation in research.  Federal regulations should also spell out clearly the obligation of 
physicians or institutions acting on their behalf to report information about compensation for 
research and other financial interests to IRBs or conflicts committees.  
4.  Achieving Transparency
Consistent with the national movement towards transparency in industry-physician rela-
tionships, federal law should require disclosure of payments for conducting clinical trials and 
other relevant financial interests.  Specifically, before research commences, sponsors should 
report to the FDA and academic institutions should report to the granting federal agency equity 
and ownership interests as well as all payments, above a de minimis amount, to the investiga-
tor and the investigator’s institution or practice group by the company whose product is under 
review in the clinical trial.  Federal policy should consider mandating disclosure to potential 
enrollees of the method of compensation for research as well as information about conflicts of 
interest held by investigators and institutions.241
5.  Enhanced Training for Investigators
Current federal guidelines provide no specific requirements for conflicts of interest 
training for individuals who serve as investigators within or outside academic medicine.  Yet 
studies of physician knowledge and awareness of financial conflicts of interest demonstrate the 
need for specific training about the nature of conflicts, the potential harm, and the ways that 
conflicts can be managed or eliminated.242  This training should be mandatory for all investiga-
tors who conduct clinical research within and outside of academic medical centers. 
In addition, physicians in community settings who conduct research often have limited 
training in or understanding of research methodology, the ethical underpinnings of research, or 
the differences in their roles as treating physician and as research investigator.243  For this rea-
son, for physician investigators outside of academic medicine who conduct research, training 
should cover key elements of research: the importance of inclusion and exclusion criteria and 
informed consent, the ethical and scientific issues posed by particular research methods such 
as double blind placebo-controlled studies, and their obligations as an investigator compared 
to their role as a treating physician. This training should be mandatory for all investigators, 
except those who conduct only a limited number of hours of research in a given year or are not 
involved in enrollment and recruitment or data analysis.
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the level of the research institution.  The IOM defines institutional conflicts of interest as situations when there 
is the potential for the secondary interests of the institution or its senior officials to have an undue influence. 
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51 Harold E. Glass, Do Clinical Grant Payment Practices in Phase 3 Clinical Trials Influence Subsequent 
Clinical Investigator Prescribing Behavior? 7 DiSeaSe mgmt. 77, 80 (2004).  See also Paula S. Katz, In-Office 
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61 Getz, supra note 7, at 457; Kenneth A. Getz, Have We Pushed Our Pis Too Far?, aPPlieD CliniCal trialS online 
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1 j. emPiriCal reSearCH on HUman reSearCH etHiCS 3, 6 (2008) (reporting that 2% of IRB chairpersons and 
members surveyed believed that investigators’ financial relationships with industry should not be considered 
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105 21 C.F.R. §§ 54.4(a)(3) and 54.5(a) (2009).  The FDA regulations require sponsors to disclose to the FDA the 
following financial interests: (1) compensation that could be influenced by the outcome of the clinical trial; 
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html (last visited Sept. 21, 2009); NIH, Frequently Asked Questions for the Requirement for Education on the 
Protection of Human Subjects, available at  http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/hs_educ_faq.htm (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2009); Debra A. DeBruin et al., Educational Approaches to the Responsible Conduct of Clinical 
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126 Despite the proliferation of state anti-kickback laws, few have directly addressed financial arrangements for 
clinical research.  California law precludes pharmaceutical companies from paying fees to physicians for 
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C.F.R. §§ 50.601-50.607 (2009).
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131 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.604 and 50.605 (2009). 
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155 See generally House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Hearing, Testimony of Lewis Morris, 
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Safe Harbor Regulations, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/safeharborregulations.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2009) and 
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OIG Compliance Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23731, 23736 (May 5, 2003) 
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personal services safe harbor whenever possible.”).      
159 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d)(5) (2009). 
160 Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks, Courtesies or Cost-Effectiveness?: Application of 
the Medicare Antikickback Law to the Marketing and Promotional Practices of Drug and Medical Device 
Manufacturers, 54 fooD DrUg l.j. 279, 306 n.124 (1999).
161 See id. at 316.
162 Compliance Guidance, supra note 158, at 23736.
163 See offiCe of inSPeCtor gen., U.S. DeP’t of HealtH & HUman ServS., Promotion of PreSCriPtion DrUgS tHroUgH 
PaymentS anD giftS 4-6 (1991), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-90-00480.pdf; offiCe of 
inSPeCtor gen., U.S. DeP’t of HealtH & HUman ServS., PreSCriPtion DrUg Promotion involving  PaymentS 
anD giftS:  PHySiCianS’ PerSPeCtiveS 8, 9 (1992), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-90-00481.
pdf.  
164 Compliance Guidance, supra note 158, at 23736.
165 The Compliance Guidance explains that post-marketing research activities should be “especially scrutinized to 
ensure that they are legitimate and not simply a pretext to generate prescriptions of a drug.”  Id. at 23735.  See 
also Bulleit &  Krause, supra note 160, at 308-309.
166 See, e.g., Compliance Guidance, supra note 158, at 23735 (“Payments for research services should be fair 
market value for legitimate, reasonable, and necessary services.”).
167 Advisory Opinions are issued by the OIG “to one or more requesting parties about the application of the 
OIG’s fraud and abuse authorities to the party’s existing or proposed business arrangement”; they are “legally 
binding on the Department of Health and Human Services … and the requesting party or parties.” Office of the 
Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Advisory Opinions Frequently Asked Questions, http://
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/advisoryopinions/aofaq.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).
168 Ann Brandt & Daryl Johnson, Fair Market Value: With No Formal Fair Market Value Guidelines Imposed by 
the Government, How ‘Fair’ Is It for Pharma to Play by the Rules?, 29 PHarm. exeCUtive (2009).
169 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2009).
170 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2009); 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2009).
171 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(3) (2009).
172 42 C.F.R. § 411.351 (2009).
173 The regulations had provided that payment for physician’s services would be deemed to be fair market value 
if the rate paid was either (1) “less than or equal to the average hourly rate for emergency room physician 
services in the relevant physician market, provided there are at least three hospitals providing emergency room 
services in the market” or (2) “determined by averaging the 50th percentile national [annual] compensation 
level for physicians with the same physician specialty in at least four [of six agency-specified] surveys and 
dividing by 2,000 hours.”  42 CFR § 411.351 (2006).  In repealing the regulations in 2007, CMS stated that it 
was difficult to obtain hourly rates paid by competitor hospitals and that the specified surveys were out-of-date 
or unavailable.  See Medicare Program; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have 
Financial Relationships (Phase III), 72 Fed. Reg. 51012, 51015 (2007).
174 Medicare Program; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships 
(Phase III), 72 Fed. Reg. 51012, 51015 (2007).  See also Medicare Program; Physicians’ Referrals to Health 
Care Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships (Phase II), 69 Fed. Reg. 16054, 16107 (Mar. 26, 
2004) (“We appreciate the commenter’s desire for clear ‘bright line’ guidance. However, the statute covers 
such a wide range of potential transactions that it is not possible to verify and list appropriate benchmarks 
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or objective measures for each. Moreover, the definition of ‘fair market value’ in the statute and regulation is 
qualified in ways that do not necessarily comport with the usage of the term in standard valuation techniques 
and methodologies. For example, the methodology must exclude valuations where the parties to the transactions 
are at arm’s length but in a position to refer to one another.”).
175 Id. at 51016.  
176 Id. See, e.g., Emanuel, supra note 7, at 4147 (finding that 32% of a physician-investigator’s time was spent on 
non-clinical activities).
177 26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-6 (2009).
178 Internal Revenue Service, Business Valuation Guidelines, http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-048-004.
html#d0e10 (last visited Sept. 10, 2009).  See, e.g., Andrea M. Ferrari et al., Determining ‘Fair Market Value’ 
for Physician Services: The New ‘Big Question’ for Life Sciences Companies, 3 life SCienCeS 9, 10 (2009) 
(setting forth the cost, income, and market approaches to determining the FMV of an asset).
179 AdvaMed Code, supra note 67, at 2; PhRMA Clinical Trials Principles, supra note 66, at 15-16.
180 Pfizer, supra note 73.
181 D.C. CoDe § 48-833.01 (2009); me. rev. Stat. ann. tit. 22, § 2698-A (2009); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 111N, 
§ 6 (2009); minn. Stat. § 151.47(f) (2009); vt. Stat. ann. tit. 18, § 4632 (2009); 2009 w. va. aCtS 108 
(transferring authority to require the reporting of pharmaceutical advertising costs from the Pharmaceutical 
Cost Management Council to the Governor’s Office of Health Enhancement and Lifestyle Planning).
182 See, e.g., Cal. HealtH & Safety CoDe § 24173(c) (2009) (requiring that research participants be informed of 
any sponsor, funding source, or manufacturer of a drug or device, and the organization “under whose general 
aegis the experiment is being conducted.”); n.j. Stat. § 26:14-4 (2009) (requiring disclosure where medical 
research involves “persons with cognitive impairments, lack of capacity, or serious physical or behavioral 
conditions and life-threatening diseases.”).
183 Physician Payments Sunshine Act, S. 301, 111th Cong. (2009).
184 See, e.g., America’s Affordable Health Choices Act of 2009, H.R. 3200, 111th Cong. (2009).
185 See, e.g., S. 301 §2 (amending the Social Security Act to include §1128G (a) and (g)(10)(B)(i)).
186 Id.
187 See, e.g., H.R. 3200 § 1451 (amending the Social Security Act to include §§ 1128H(a)(4) and (5)) and 
providing for delayed reporting of payments made pursuant to product development agreements and clinical 
investigations).
188 Generally, PHS and FDA have broad authority to enact regulations with regard to conflicts of interest.  Under 
the Public Health Service Act and other applicable law, HHS has authority to regulate institutions engaged in 
HHS conducted or supported research involving human subjects.  For HHS conducted or supported research, 
the funding agency may impose additional conditions as necessary for the protection of human subjects. 45 
CFR § 46.124. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, FDA has the authority to regulate Institutional 
Review Boards (IRBs) and investigators involved in the review or conduct of FDA-regulated research.
189 offiCe of inSPeCtor gen., U.S. DeP’t of HealtH anD HUman ServS., tHe fooD anD DrUg aDminiStration’S 
overSigHt of CliniCal inveStigatorS’ finanCial information (2009), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/
reports/oei-05-07-00730.pdf.  The report found that FDA had not documented review of the information in 
31% of the applications.
190 offiCe of inSPeCtor gen., U.S. DeP’t of HealtH anD HUman ServS., national inStitUteS of HealtH: ConfliCtS 
of intereSt in extramUral reSearCH (2008), available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-03-06-00460.
pdf.  
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191 Companies become aware of investigations of particular practices within the industry early in their inception; 
by the time a settlement is actually announced, the industry has frequently addressed the offensive behavior. 
Consequently, settlements sometimes address out-of-date behaviors. 
192 Reed Abelson, Financial Ties Are Cited as Issue in Spine Study, n.y. timeS, Jan. 30, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/30/business/30spine.html.   The N.Y. timeS reports that one participant in the 
Prodisc clinical trials brought suit, alleging that her surgeon “seemed more concerned with the prospects for the 
Prodisc than for her medical care.”  The suit was settled in 2007.  
193 Press Release, Synthes,  Synthes Settles with New Jersey Attorney General and Agrees to Reimburse Investigation 
Costs of US $236,000 (May 5, 2009), http://www.synthes.com/html/News-Details.8013.0.html?&tx_
synthesnewsbyxml_pi1[showUid]=22.
194 Notably, the Agreement explicitly permits “financial incentives directed solely at patient accrual or patient 
follow-up” and fails to require that physician-investigators disclose such incentives to research participants. 
This does not mean, of course, that the IRB or conflict of interest committee might not require disclosure of 
these financial incentives.  The Agreement makes no mention of a conflict of interest committee and appears to 
assume that responsibility for managing conflicts will rest with the IRB. Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, 
supra note 5, at Section C, Part 9.
195 Id. at Section C, Part 1(d).
196 Jon Kamp, New Jersey’s AG Issued Subpoena to J&J’s DePuy Unit in May, wall St. j., Aug. 4, 2009, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124942513406505943.html. 
197 Indictment, U.S. v. Biovail Pharm., Inc. (D. Mass. 2008); U.S. v. Biovail Pharm., No. 08-cr-10124-NG 
(D. Mass., sentencing announced 9/14/09); New Jersey Company Agrees to Plead Guilty to Kickbacks and 
Conspiracy Charges and Pay More Than $22 Million Dollars in Criminal Fine, supra note 6. 
198 See Robertson v. McGee, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4072, at *9 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 28, 2002) (suit against hospital, 
principal investigator, pharmaceutical sponsor, a top university official, members of the IRB, and university 
bioethicist for deaths occurring during Phase I trial of a cancer vaccine; the court held that there is no private 
right of action for violation of the federal regulations governing human subjects research).
199 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1291 (W.D. Wa. 2002).
200 Id. at 1286; see also Duff Wilson & David Heath, The Blood Cancer Experiment: Patients Never Knew the Full 
Danger of Trial They Staked Their Lives On, Seattle timeS, 2001, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.
com/uninformed_consent/bloodcancer/story1.html.
201 Wilson & Heath, supra note 200.  The Hutch denied the reporters’ allegations and there were complaints 
that the reporting was biased.  See Q & A on This Series, Seattle timeS, Mar. 25, 2001, available at http://
seattletimes.nwsource.com/uninformed_consent/qa.html.
202 Specifically, the court rejected the claim that by withholding information the defendants violated the trial 
participants’ rights under the federal human subjects protection regulations, and their rights as third-party 
beneficiaries of the Hutch’s Federalwide Assurance, a written assurance of compliance with the human subjects 
protection regulations which institutions engaged in research conducted or supported by HHS must execute. 
203 David Heath & Luke Timmerman, Jury Finds Hutch Not Negligent in 4 Deaths, Seattle timeS, April 9, 




206 Complaint, Darke v. Isner, No. 02-2194-E (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2002).
207 Darke v. Isner, No. 02-2194-E, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 250, at *3 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2004).
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208 Complaint, Darke v. Isner.
209 Darke, 2004 Mass. Super. LEXIS 250 at *4-10.
210 Dr. Isner passed away in October 2001.
211 Darke v. Isner, No. 02-2194-E, 2005 Mass. Super. LEXIS 663, at *15-17 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2005). The court 
also denied the Isner Estate’s motion for summary judgment on Darke’s negligence/wrongful death claim, 
finding that enough evidence was presented to demonstrate that a doctor-patient relationship existed, and also 
denied the Estate’s motion to dismiss Darke’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.  The court 
granted the Estate’s intentional battery and breach of contract summary judgment motions.
212 Id. at 22-25.  Although the deceit and gross negligence claims survived summary judgment, it appears from the 
docket and from the verdict that the jury ultimately dismissed these claims on the merits.  Jury Verdict, Darke 
v. Isner, No. 02-2194-E, 2007 WL 2219825 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 4, 2007).
213  Complaint, Gelsinger v. Trustees of the Univ. of Pa.
214  Id.
215 David Resnik, Disclosing Conflicts of Interest to Research Subjects: An Ethical and Legal Analysis, 11 
aCCoUntability in reSearCH 141, 142 (2004).
216 Settlement is Reached in Fatal Experiment, n.y. timeS, Feb. 10, 2005, available at http://query.nytimes.com/
gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0DE2D6163AF933A25751C0A9639C8B63.  
217 Gerald R. Prettyman, Jr., Ethical Reforms in Biotechnology Research Regulations, 15 va. j. SoC. Pol’y & l. 
51, 69 (2007).  
218 Studies and compensation models that are motivated primarily by product promotion and not a need for 
scientific inquiry or that are unlikely to produce useful data do not qualify as research and are therefore ethically 
unjustifiable and should never occur.
219 This risk is real.  Internet research reveals several articles directed to a physician audience purporting to outline 
for physicians how to take advantage of the lucrative opportunities available by running clinical trials out 
of their private practices.  See, e.g., Clinical Trials May Represent a Business Opportunity, PHySiCian ComP. 
rePort (Aug. 23, 2000), http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0FBW/is_13_1/ai_64777380/.    
220 See Section III.B.1, supra.
221 See Boyd, supra note 45, at 207.
222 See Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 115, at 254.
223 See Section III.A.5 supra.
224 See, Richard A. Romero, Fair Market Value: Taking a Proactive Approach, 62 HealtHCare fin. management 
88, 90 (2008) (discussing “three possible approaches that can be used to determine fair market value: the cost 
approach, the market approach, and the income approach.”). 
225 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
226 Ferrari, supra note 178, at 11 (listing criteria to consider, including the physician’s educational credentials, 
specialized training, professional certifications, leadership experience, and academic appointments and the 
specific responsibilities and expected time commitment involved).
227 See Section II.B.5, supra.
228 Friedman, supra note 80, at 275.
229 See Sections II.B.5 and III.A.4, supra.
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230 This is distinct from but raises issues similar to circumstances where investigators and institutions hold more 
than a de minimis equity stake or patent or other intellectual property interest that could be affected by research 
they are considering conducting. This situation is discussed in Section IV.C.2.  
231 The Public Health Service regulations on investigator conflicts of interest promulgated in 1995 define a person 
covered by the regulations as any investigator involved in designing, conducting or reporting on funded 
research, as well as the investigator’s spouse and dependent children. 42 C.F.R. § 50.603.
232 See AAMC-AAU 2008 COI Report, supra note 2, at 6; IOM Report, supra note 2, at S-14. 
233 As proposed by IOM, this exception should exist “only if the conflict of interest committee (a) determines 
that an individual’s participation is essential for the conduct of the research and (b) establishes an effective 
mechanism for managing the conflict and protecting the integrity of the research.” iom rePort, supra note 2, 
at 4-17.
234 See Section II.C.1, supra.
235 See Promotion wHite PaPer, supra note 1, at 1.
236 See Responsibility of Applicants for Promoting Objectivity in Research for Which Public Health Service 
Funding Is Sought and Responsible Prospective Contractors; Request for Comments, supra note 134.
237 45 CFR § 46.107 (e) (2009).
238 iom rePort, supra note 2, at 8-1-8-11.
239 See Section II.A.7, supra.
240 For a discussion of the characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of independent IRBs, see Coleman et 
al., supra note 122, at 197-201; Lis & Murray, supra note 47, at 84-90.
241 See Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Disclosure of Financial Relationships to Participants in Clinical Research, 361 
new engl. j. meD. 916, 919-920 (2009).  The AAMC also supports such a practice.  See aamC-aaU 2008 
Coi rePort, supra note 2, at 26.
242 See Section II.C.3, supra.
243 See id.




Summary of March 23 Forum on  
Enrollment and Recruitment into Clinical Trials
On March 23, 2009, the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy at Seton Hall 
Law School hosted a Forum to address the ethical, legal and policy issues posed by recruitment 
and enrollment of human subjects into clinical research. Entitled, Protecting Participants, 
Advancing Science: An Agenda for Reform of Clinical Research Recruitment and Enrollment, 
the Forum brought together leaders from academic medicine, industry, academia, consumer 
organizations, legal and ethics experts and government representatives.   The goal of the Forum 
was to inform the Center’s work on articles and white papers laying out recommendations for 
public policy and institutional practices to enhance protection for research participants and the 
scientific integrity of clinical research.  
The Forum began with a presentation by Carl Coleman, J.D., Professor of Law, Seton 
Hall University School of Law, on “The Legal Framework for Recruitment and Enrollment,” 
in which he described the current state of federal regulation of human subjects recruitment. 
Tracy Miller, J.D., Executive Director of the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy 
presented a summary of key empirical evidence related to disclosure of physician financial 
incentives to prospective research participants, entitled “Physician Financial Incentives: What 
do the Data Show?”  Following these presentations, the participants covered several key topics 
posed by recruitment and enrollment of human subjects into clinical research: (i) physician-
investigator payments and recruitment incentives, including finder’s fees, recruitment and 
retention bonuses, and per capita payments and the implications of such payments for the 
interests of participants; (ii) disclosure of compensation for research and other financial 
interests of investigators and institutions to participants in research, and to IRBs; and (iii) 
financial incentives for participants in research.  On each topic, the Forum participants shared 
their diverse perspectives and expertise, and explored common ground for concrete, practical 
solutions to advance the protections accorded participants in clinical trials.  
On the first topic, many of the Forum participants noted that bonuses for recruitment 
and retention are problematic; some questioned how widely used they are at this time. In terms 
of finder’s fees for referring individuals into a study, a clear distinction was made between fair 
market value compensation for time spent screening and educating patients about the study and 
payment solely for a referral which should not be acceptable. Widespread agreement supported 
per capita payments, with some participants recognizing the lack of a clear methodology for 
such payments, especially outside the context of academic medicine. 
On the topic of disclosing financial interests to participants in research, the Forum 
participants expressed a range of views.  For example, some expressed the opinion that disclosure 
might further complicate an already complex informed consent process. Others advocated far 
more explicit disclosure than has occurred to date, arguing that participants in practice and 
in studies conducted on attitudes about disclosure have not been given the information that 
is most salient – information about the magnitude or amount of the compensation paid. Some 
thought potential participants would not have a context to understand this information. Overall, 
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the discussion recognized that disclosure by itself is not an adequate response to conflicts of 
interest, but must be paired with enhanced oversight by government, including clearer policy 
guidance for the obligations of institutions to identify and manage conflicts of interest. 
Addressing the issue of incentives and payment for human subjects in clinical trials, 
many of the Forum participants agreed that the prevailing regulatory framework which prohibits 
any compensation that would unduly influence the decision to enter a trial, is unrealistic 
and unfair to clinical trials participants. Overall, many participants urged that the existing 
regulatory framework should be revisited and reformulated. Researchers, employees of the 
sponsor, and others who are part of the chain leading up to and conducting the trial are all paid 
for their participation. Those who enroll should be paid as well for their time, inconvenience, 
and discomfort. However, on this latter point, several of the participants noted the dilemma 
of paying for discomfort and risk, because while it is the reality of how patients are recruited 
to undertake certain studies, higher payment for greater risks may also be an inducement 
for lower income or more vulnerable individuals to undertake risks that may result in harm, 
without the prospect of reimbursement by the sponsor or the entity conducting the research.  
Participants at the Forum on  
Enrollment and Recruitment into Clinical Trials
Gary Budney, BS, Senior Director Compliance & Business Practices,  
Schering-Plough Corporation 
Cathryn Clary, MD, Vice President U.S. External Medical Affairs, Pfizer Inc.
Nancy Dubler, LLB, Consultant for Ethics New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation 
and Senior Associate, Montefiore-Einstein Center for Bioethics  
Susan H. Ehringhaus, JD, Associate General Counsel, Regulatory Counsel,  
Association of American Medical Colleges  
Terry Fadem, MS, Managing Director, Corporate Alliances,  
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine   
Felix A. Khin-Maung-Gyi, PharmaD, MBA, CEO, Chesapeake Research Review
Arthur Levin, MPH, Director, Center for Medical Consumers
Jerry Menikoff, MD, JD, Director, Office of Human Research Protections,  
U.S. Department of Health & Human Services  
Mary Monovoukas, JD, Senior Director, Corporate Counsel, Boston Scientific Corporation
Lori Queisser, BS, Senior Vice President Global Compliance & Business Practices,  
Schering-Plough Corporation                               
Denise V. Rodgers, MD, Provost & Executive Vice President,  
University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey
Adil Shamoo, PhD, Professor, University of Maryland School of Medicine,  
Co-Founder, CIRCARE  
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Jay P. Siegel, MD, Group President, Research & Development, President,  
Centocor Research & Development, Johnson & Johnson 
Jeffrey H. Silverstein, MD, Professor, Vice Chair for Research, Department of  
Anesthesiology, Mount Sinai School of Medicine 
Marjorie Speers, PhD, President & CEO, AAHRPP     
David H. Strauss, MD, Professor & Director, Office of Human Subjects Research,  
Columbia University Medical Center
Michelle Weiner, JD, Deputy Attorney General, Affirmative Litigation Section,  
State of New Jersey, Department of Law & Public Safety
Alan Wertheimer, PhD, Senior Research Scholar, Department of Bioethics, Clinical Center, 
National Institutes of Health
Participants from Seton Hall Law School  
Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
Kathleen M. Boozang, JD, LLM, Associate Dean for Academic Advancement &  
Professor of Law
Carl Coleman, JD, Professor of Law & Faculty Director, Center for Health &  
Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
Tracy Miller, JD,* Executive Director, Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
Kate Greenwood, JD, Faculty Researcher, Center for Health & Pharmaceutical  
Law & Policy
Valerie Gutmann, JD, Faculty Researcher, Center for Health & Pharmaceutical  
Law & Policy 
* Ms. Miller served as Executive Director through September 4, 2009.
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appendix B
Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy
The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy at Seton Hall University Law 
School advances scholarship and recommendations for public policy on cutting edge issues 
posed by pharmaceutical and health law.  The Center also serves as a forum to convene lead-
ers in government, industry, academia, medicine and consumer organizations to examine the 
issues posed by clinical and policy developments and explore potential solutions.  The Center 
builds upon the nationally recognized scholarship in health law, conferences on key public 
policy questions, and an internationally recognized healthcare compliance training program 
that are part of the Health Law & Policy Program at Seton Hall Law School.  
The Center: 
Researches, reviews, and develops policy recommendations on key issues on health • 
and pharmaceutical law to inform and shape policy at the state and national levels;
Produces scholarship through journal publication and white papers on emerging le-• 
gal, ethical, and social issues in health and pharmaceutical law;
Provides a neutral forum to convene leaders in government, industry, academia, and • 
medicine to engage in an informed dialogue, consider pressing policy questions, and 
explore potential solutions;
Offers educational programs on health and pharmaceutical issues by leading experts • 
from the public and private sectors to examine important policy and legal issues; 
and
Holds compliance education and training programs on state, federal and interna-• 
tional regulatory requirements that govern the research, approval, promotion, and 
sale of drugs and devices. 
The Center operates under the direction of Associate Dean and Professor Kathleen • 
Boozang, Executive Director of Global Healthcare Compliance & Ethics Educa-
tion Simone Handler-Hutchinson, and Staff.  In addition to their expertise in public 
policy, health and pharmaceutical law, ethical issues in medicine, and healthcare 
compliance, the Center draws upon the intellectual strength of the Seton Hall Law 
School faculty.  Faculty members bring to the Center  s work nationally recognized 
expertise in pharmaceutical law, not-for-profit governance, intellectual property law 
and bioethics, among other areas. 
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appendix c
Center Financial Disclosure Statement and Policies
The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy of Seton Hall Law School is 
committed to independent academic inquiry focusing on issues affecting health and pharma-
ceutical law and policy.  As a part of Seton Hall University, the Newark-based Law School is a 
nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization.  The University and Law School engage in fundraising from 
alumni and other contributors.  Remaining committed examining divergent perspectives on 
policy issues related to health and pharmaceutical law and policy is critical to the mission of 
the Center.
Law School faculty members and Center Staff are devoted to academic independence in 
their research and transparency in their relationships.  As such, funding sources are announced 
on all published materials and on the Law School Web site.  Regardless of whether financial 
support is received in the form of an endowment, as unrestricted funds or for a specific project, 
Law School and Center donors are not involved in the academic work of Law School professors 
or Center Staff.  Grants and donations are only accepted if they do not limit the faculty’s or the 
Center’s ability to carry out research free of outside influence and consistent with the Center 
 s mission and values.
Seton Hall Law School funds the salaries of the faculty associated with The Center for 
Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy.  Research and administrative support for the Center 
are jointly funded by Seton Hall Law School and by unrestricted funds provided by corporate 
donors, with the Law School currently providing the majority of the funding.
The Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy and its faculty assume sole re-
sponsibility for the content of its publications and position statements.  The Center does not 
issue publications or statements on behalf of any donor or other entity. 
The corporate donors that have provided funding to the Center or to the Law School are 
listed below.
In 2009, Ernst & Young committed $25,000 to support the creation of a European • 
healthcare compliance program slated to be implemented in 2010. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb provided a $5 million endowment in 2005 in support of The • 
Harvey Washington Wiley Chaired Professorship in Corporate Governance & 
Business Ethics.  The Law School is recruiting candidates for this position.
Johnson & Johnson provided $100,000 in 2008 as seed funding for two projects • 
(i) a program on  Strategies for Compliance Professionals: Honing Decision-Making 
Skills, and (ii) creation and implementation of an international compliance program. 
It provided an additional $50,000 in unrestricted support, also in 2008. In 2007, 
Ortho-McNeil Janssen Scientific Affairs, a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson pro-
vided $49,900 in unrestricted funds. Johnson & Johnson provided $50,000 in 2007 
and $100,000 in 2006 in unrestricted funds to support the Center. Two of Johnson 
& Johnson  s subsidiaries, Centocor, Inc. and Ortho Biotech, provided $125,000 in 
unrestricted funding to the Center in 2007.
In 2006, sanofi-aventis provided $500,000 to Seton Hall Law School in  support • 
and development of the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy and the 
programs and activities associated with the Center.   
Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Trial Recruitment & Enrollment
54 Seton Hall law
In 2006, Schering-Plough Corporation made a $2.5 million commitment to be paid • 
over five years  to partially endow a tenured track/tenured faculty position dedicated 
to health care regulation.   The Law School is currently recruiting candidates for this 
position in the 2009-2010 academic year.
In 2008, Purdue Pharma provided $25,000 in unrestricted funding for the Center for • 
Health & Pharmaceutical Law & Policy.
In 2008, Roche provided $50,000 for a symposium sponsored by the Gibbons Insti-• 
tute of Law, Science & Technology, the Seton Hall Law Review, and the Center on 
Preparing for a Pharmaceutical Response to Pandemic Influenza. 
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For further information about 
Programs and publications of 
the Center for Health & Pharmaceutical law & Policy 
please visit our website at law.shu.edu
tHe Center For HealtH & 
PHarmaCeutiCal law & PoliCy 
 
Seton Hall university School of law 
one newark Center 
newark, nJ 07102 
tel: 973-642-8190 
law.shu.edu
